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NOTES

Leveling
the
Playing
Field
for
Religious "Liberty" in Russia:
A
Critical Analysis of the 1997 Law "On
Freedom of Conscience and Religious
Associations"
There arefive clusters of public opinion in Russia rangingfrom the
retrogradefascism to libertariandemocracy... and each exists to a
greater or lesser degree within EACH AND EVERY RUSSIAN.
Because these dusters of opinion are pitched in battle with one
another,Russia'sfuture remains very much in doubt
Boris Grushin, a leading Russian public opinion specialist 1

The state is the defense and support of the independent church, and
the church is the spiritualleader and guardianangel of the Christian
state
I.A. Wi'in, Russian jurist and philosopher (1883-1954)2
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INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended an acute
confrontation
between
two
socio-economic
systems.
In
subsequent years, the West has exhibited both euphoria and
exasperation over the developments in Russia. Russia's record in
the area of human rights, including religious rights, conforms to
the overall "roller-coaster" pattern of its attempts to become a
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truly democratic state.3

As a result, the West continues to

perceive Russia with a certain apprehension: periodic goodwill
among political leaders and the relative CNN silence about the
events in Russia have left the West with an uneasy, latent
anticipation of what might happen next.
In the summer of 1997, the acrimonious debate over freedom
of conscience and the role of religion and church in Russia
attracted international attention. The passage of a comprehensive
4
new law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations"
was a landslide s victory for the conservatives, concluding a sevenyear battle to amend the groundbrealdng, progressive law "On
Freedom of Religion."6 The 1997 law, while enjoying popular
support, generated strong criticism because of its effective
curtailment of the legal rights of certain religious associations and
individuals. 7 Nevertheless, the new law afforded substantial and

3.
In the 1990' Russia has faced the tremendous challenge of preserving its
territorial integrity while simultaneously upholding democratic norms. The war in
Chechnya highlighted this dilemma. Ultimately, it demonstrated that Russia would
suspend the rule of law in critical situations. See, e.g., Elizabeth K Cooper, Comment
on "TransitionalConstitutionalism:Politics and Law in Russia Since 1993." 14 Wis. INTL
L.J. 531, 540 (1996).
4.
FEDERAL'NYI ZAKON 0 SVOBODE SOVESr I 0 RELIGIOZNYH OB'EDINENIYH
[Federal Law on the Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations], Sobr.
Zakonod. RF, 1997, No.39, Item 4465; Ross. Gazeta, 1 Oct, 1997, at No.190. (RF)
[hereinafter THE NEW LAW] (all translations are by the author).
5.
The State Duma voted 358-6, with four abstentions, in favor of the bill. See
Igor Zhukov, Religion Law to Protect Russians from Radical Sects, ITAR TASS NEWS
AGENCY, Sept 19, 1997, at 1, availablein LEXIS, News Library, TASS International File;
Russian Duma Passes Revised Religion Bil4 U.P.I., Sept 19, 1997, at 1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, International File.
The upper house of parliament, the
Federation Council, unanimously voted in favor of the measure. See Dmitriy Zaks,
FederationCouncil Approves Relgion Bill, MOSCOW TIMES, Sept 25, 1997, at 1, available
in LEXIS, News library, File No.1301 (quoting a prominent member of the Federation
Council who claimed that Russians "have flooded" him with letters demanding to draft
legislation "regulating the work of destructive cults.")
6.
ZAKON RsFSR 0 SVOBODE VEROISpovEDANII [The Law of RSFSR On Freedom
of Religion], Vedomosti RSFSR, 1990, Issue No. 21, Item No. 267-1, at 240 [hereinafter
1990 RUSSIAN LAW]. For a discussion of this law see Harold J. Berman, Religious Rights
in Russia at a Time of Tumultuous Transition: A Historical Theory, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS INGLOBAL PERSPEcTIVE LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 285, 295-97 (Johan D. van der Vyver
& John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPEcTIVE]; W. Cole Durham, Jr., Lauren B. Homer, Peter van Dijk, John Witte, Jr. et
al, The Future of Religious Liberty in Russia: Report of the De Burght Conference on
PendingRussian LegislationRestrictingReligious Liberty, 8 EMORY INTI L.REv. 1, 2-4, 30
(1994) [hereinafter De BurghtReport].

7.

See, e.g., David Hoffman, Yeltsin and Religion Gore Appeals Against a

Russian Curb, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (NEUILLY-SUR-SEINE, FR.), Sept 23, 1997, at 10,
available in LEXIS, News Library; Yeltsin Signs ControversialReligion Law, AGENCE FR.
PRESSE, -Sept.26, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, Intl News File (quoting regrets
expressed by the White house officials and the leaders of the Catholic community);
Charles W. Holmes, Yeltsin Ok's Restricting Some Faiths,ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept 27,
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much needed political legitimacy to the indecisive Russian
legislative branch as well as to the President.8 These diametrically
opposed responses to the new legislation naturally translated into
socio-political discomfort both in Russia and in the international
arena.
Yet the rigid cultural stereotypes propagated by the Russian
and Western media do not provide an adequate understanding of
the origins and the repercussions of the new law. The purpose of
this Note is to present a more comprehensive framework for
analyzing the status of religious human rights in Russia after the
enactment of the new law. Following the insights of an eminent
scholar on law and religion, Prof. Harold J. Berman, the topic may
be evaluated with a view to positive law (Zakon), moral theory
1997, at 03B, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Foreign File (citing comments by the
OSCE representative that the new law "does not represent progress toward the path to

religious coexistence").
The majority of Russians apparently supported the bill. See Eric Burkett,
Orthodoy Expert Says Russian People Back Religious Restrictions, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NWS, Oct 11, 1997, at 8C, available in LEXIS, News Library. However, there were
outspoken domestic opponents of the law such as leading religious rights activist Fr.
Gleb Yakunin. See David Filipov, Yeltsin Signs Law Restricting Some Religions: Critics
Say Constution Vilated, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept 27, 1997, at A2, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Foreign File (criticizing the subjection of religion to the whim of the state).
There was also a public protest staged by the opponents of the new law. See Julia
Shargorodska, 5,000 Decry Church Law At City Park, MOSCOw TIMES, Oct 8, 1997,
(Almost all the
available in LEXIS, News Library, Indep. Press File No.1310.
demonstrators appeared to be Russian and tried to emphasize their nationality by
singing popular songs accompanied by balalaika; Anatoly Pchelintsev, Director of the
Moscow Institute of Law and Religion, led the protest).
8.
See generally Melor Sturna, Svobodu Propovediv Rossii Senat SSHA Ozenil v
200 M'lionov Dollarov [The U.S. Senate Valued the Freedom to Preach at $200 million],

IzESTA, Oct 1, 1997, at I (arguing that, by passing a measure popular with the

majority of the electorate, Russian leaders paid attention to their own political priorities
and increased their political capital even though they lost $200 millions in aid from the

U.S.).
Conservatives accused Yeltsin of bowing to Western pressure when he vetoed an
earlier version of the law in July 1997. See Peter Ford, Curb on Religious Freedom in
Russia May Rise Again, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 24, 1997, at 6:3 (communist
deputy V. Ilyukhin stated that the veto "provided further proof that Russia has become
a protectorate of the West" and called to "limit Western pressure over the minds of

Russian citizens); Newsline- Yeltsin Expecting ReligionLaw Overnde, THE PATRIOT LEDGER
(Quincy, Ma), July 24, 1997, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library (citing a comment
by V. Kuptsov, top communist lawmaker, that Yeltsin's actions lead to 'the public
humiliation of Russia"); Yeltsin Intends to Pass Freedom of Conscience Law,
NE7AVISiMAYA GAZETA, July 29, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, RusData
File (A. Isayev, a prominent labor leader, said that turning down the law was a "grave
political error" and that Russian labor unions were indignant at the overt international
political pressure).
The Parliament, on the other hand, was a popular champion of the Orthodox
Church and a protector of the people against destructive 'totalitarian sects.' See
Zhukov, supra note 5 (quoting Chairman of Parliament's Committee for Religion and
Public Organizations).
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(Pravo), and Russian historical experiences. 9 Generally, positive
law refers to domestic legal norms. Moral theory also stems
primarily from domestic supra-legal sources, but it may connote
global human rights principles where a state subscribes to
monism,' 0 as Russia currently does. Historical contingencies can
be described as prior experiences and the related set of solutions
developed in the past. Historical experiences are relevant because
of a society's natural proclivity to apply these time-tested
solutions to new circumstances. Writing about a failed attempt to
amend the liberal religious freedom law in 1993, Professor
Berman correctly pointed to the overpowering force of historical
contingencies in informing Russian legislation and molding both
positive law and morality.1 1
The situation in 1997 mirrored the one in 1993.12 The
dissolving of the Russian legislature in 1993 merely postponed
the resolution of a drama surrounding Russian religious policies
that reached its expected outcome in 1997. Once again, the
needs of the state trampled the legal guarantees contained in the
Russian Constitution and numerous instruments of international

9.
See Berman, supranote 6, at 285-87. For an excellent summary of zakon
vs. pravo dichotomy, see William E. Butler, Justice in Russia, in THE INTEGRATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE OF HAROLD J. BERMAN, 13, 22-24 (Howard 0. Hunter ed., 1996).
10.
For a discussion of monism and dualism see Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exchtsion and Its Progeny, 100
HARV. L.R. 853, 864-866 (1987) (illustrating an interesting contrast between the role of
international law in the U.S. and in Russia) As a part of its full-scale democratization,
Russia borrowed a multitude of international rules in the areas of political and civil
rights. The country has clearly subscribed to monism in its Constitution. See KONsT.
RF (1993), arts. 17(1), 15(4). See Antti Korkeakivi, The Reach of Rights in the New
Russian Constitution, 3 CARDOZO J. INTZ & COMP. L. 229, 243 (1995) (summarizing
various types of human rights included in the Russian Constitution and identifying
various ways to enforce them).
1 1.
See Berman, supranote6, at 297-304.
12.
The parallels between the proposed religious law reform in 1993 and in
1997 are worth noting. In each case, the major forces driving reform were the
nationalists-communists and Christian Democrats, labor and agrarian Parties-and

the Moscow Patriarchate. Both bills received ovenvhelming support from the legislative
branch before the President vetoed them. The coup in August 1993 and the
subsequent dismissal of the legislature halted the momentum of the first proposed law.
For an insightful first-hand description of these events, see Michael Bourdeaux,
Glasnost' and the Gosper The Emergence of Religious Pluralism, in THE POLITICS OF
RELIGION INRussIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EuRASIA 113, 118-123 (Michael Bourdeaux
ed., 1995) [hereinafter THE POLrICS OF RELIGIONI. In 1997, Yeltsin again countered the
populist legislation with his veto. Yet, he acknowledged the need for more effective
regulation of religious organizations and was prepared to compromise. See Andrei
Zolotov, Compromise Alters Little in Religion Bil, Moscow IMES, Sept 3, 1997, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Indep. Press File No.1285. See Mikhail Sivertsev,
Civil Society and Religion in TraditionalPolitical Culture: The Case of Russia, in THE
POLITICS OF RELIGION, supra, at 75-94, for a description of the major types of parties in
Russia and an interesting correlation between political and religious pluralism.
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law adopted by Russia. This Note explores the reasons for such a
deplorable detour from the rule of law and attempts to chart the
reach of the new legislation.
The discussion in Part II begins with a synopsis of religious
policies in Russian history. It then offers general observations on
Russian cultural predilections regarding religion, state, and the
people. These constitute the most powerful strand of supra-legal
sources-the Russian version of natural law. Part III identifies an
alternative set of higher legal norms and principles contained in
international religious rights instruments 13 and in the 1993
Russian Constitution. Part IV starts with a description of the
post-Soviet religious landscape and focuses on political and
cultural motivations for the new legislation. It then lays out the
structure of the new law and provides a commentary on
important provisions. The Note assesses the law in light of
constitutional guarantees, international norms, and practical
domestic imperatives. Part V examines the potential effects of law
and suggests the ways to resist gross abuses in its application.
The Note concludes by asserting that if Russia blindly follows the
worst features of its historic heritage the forecast is bleak. Yet,
the future looks brighter if Russia follows international and
constitutional norms in developing tempered cooperationist or
endorsed 14 paradigms of church-state relations. This scenario
satisfies both the Russian quest for its unique cultural identity as
well as its ambitions to become a truly democratic state.

II. HIGHLIGHTS IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION AND
RELIGIOUS POLICIES IN RUSSIA
Religious policy is a sensitive area because it is intimately
connected with a state's history and is informed to a large extent

13,
Constitutional provisions, international treaties, and "universally
recognized" principles in the area of human rights function as both a set of aspirational
ideals, "the supreme value," and as directly applicable positive rules. See KONSr. RF.,
supranote 10, at arts. 2, 17(1) & 18. In the former capacity, they present an antithesis
to traditional Russian moral theory. As legal norms, Constitutional provisions are "the
supreme law." Id at art. 15(1). International agreements supersede inconsistent
domestic laws and customary international law is a "part' of the Russian legal system.
IL at art. 15(4).
14.
This terminology is borrowed from a comprehensive discussion of different
models of church-state relations and the content of religious liberty in them. See.Cole
W. Durham, Perspectiveson Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework, in RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS INGLOBAL PERsPEcrmE, supranote 6, at 1-45 [hereinafter Comparative

Framework]. For a summary of broad comparative classifications by other scholars,
see Johan D. van der Vyver, Legal Dimensionsof Religious HumanRights: Constitutional
TeXts, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS INGLOBAL PERSPECITVE, supranote 6, at XIX-XX.
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by elusive national consciousnesses formed over centuries. In
order to grasp the motivations and full implications of the
positivist norms, one must understand the cultural milieu in
which they operate. Russian history reflects a version of religious
policies that are in sharp contrast to the Enlightenmentinfluenced Western European and American traditions.' 5 The
following discussion explores these differences in a systematic
way that adds another dimension to the appreciation of the

challenges that Russia currently faces.
A. HistoricalDevelopments

The following is a brief summary of crucial events that
formed Russian attitudes towards religion and the role of the
Orthodox Church. It draws heavily on the political-juridical
16
theory of Russian history.
1. The Early Period (10th-17th Century)
If the Russian legacy contains any trace of religious
"pluralism," a pre-Christian worship of local natural forces is
probably the best illustration of the early decentralized religious
practices of various Slavic tribes. 17 In the tenth century, the
Kievan princes' desire to unify the tribal lands prompted them to
adopt a common religion as a moral foundation for the emerging

15.
For an exploration of the cultural and historic forces that determined the
content of freedom of religion in the United States, see John Witte, Jr., The Essential
Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 372, 376-405 (1996). The essential American freedom of religion values
are liberty of conscience, free exercise of religion, pluralism, equality, separationism,
and disestablishment of religion. These are derived from four influential historical
perspectives: Puritan, Evangelical, Civic Republican, and Enlightenment Interestingly,
current Russian policies aiming to revive religious ethics and ethos as pillars of civil
society and favoring a predominant religion while maintaining institutional separation
between church and state resemble Civic Republican and Puritan ideologies
respectively. In fact, Massachusetts and other New England states maintained
"slender" establishment with special privileges to Calvinists until the 1830'. See id. at
388-89. Unlike the U.S., Russia does not have domestic parallels to countervailing
Evangelical (religious equality) and Enlightenment (benign secularism and human
rights) traditions. Both of these theories are reflected in international religious rights
instruments. However, for Russia, these international norms remain culturally alien.
16.
The major Nineteenth Century proponents of this influential school are V.
Kliuchevsldi, S. Soloviev, and B. Chicherin. For a good summary, see HUGH RAGSDALE,
THE RUSSiAN TRAGEDY: THEBURDEN OF HISTORY 30-32 (1996).
17.
For two interesting discussions of pre-Christian religious practices in
Russia and their interaction with Christianity, see B.D.Grekov, Kreshenie Rusi
[Christening of Russia], at 40-42 and M. N. Tikhomirov, Jazucheskoe Mirovozzrenie i
Khristianstvo [Pagan Worldview and Christianity], at 42-46, in RELIGIA I TSERKOV' V
IsTORiI ROssII [Religion and Church in Russian History] (A.M. Sakharov ed., 1975).
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After a careful screening of several predominant
state. i s
religions, Prince Vladimir was baptized by Byzantine priests in
988 A.D. and ordered his entourage to convert to Christianity as
well. 19 Thus, from the earliest times, the foreign Church
depended on princes for support and legitimization. 2 0 The
intimate relationship between church and state was further
reinforced by a doctrine of caesaropapism 21 peculiar to Greek
Christianity. In contrast to Western Catholicism, the Eastern
Orthodox Church never challenged the supreme role of secular
rulers. 2 2 St. Sergius' blessing of prince St. Dmitry Donskoy before
a decisive battle with the Mongols in 1388 exemplifies the
symphonia 2 3 that characterized the relations between the princes
and clerics.
The St. Sergius-Donskoy dynamic also illustrates that the

Church extolled civic patriotism as a religious virtue. 24 The

Orthodox Church was synonymous with Russian lands and the
Russian people as a whole, in addition to being a close ally of the
political elite. 25 The people were addressed not as "citizens" but
PAUL D. STEEVS, KEEPING THE FAITHS: RELIGION AND IDEOLOGY INTHE SOVIET
18.
UNION 19 (1989).
The monk Nestor's Eleventh Century account of Vladimir's baptism is the
19.
primary historical source. See THE RUSSIAN PRIMARY CHRONICLE 96-97, 110-11, 116-17
(Samuel H. Cross & Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor eds. & trans., 1953), reprintedin PAUL
D. STEEVES, KEEPING THE FAITHS:

RELIGION AND IDEOLOGY IN THE SOVIET UNION 19-22

(1989). Vladimir selected Orthodox Christianity for its aesthetic beauty and a lack of
objectionable features associated with other religions. He rejected Islam for its
abstention from alcohol and was appalled at Jewish political inability to keep their
land. See id.
Scholars agree that religious conversion was forced and slow. See S.
20.
Bakhushin, K Voprosu o Kreshenii Kievskoi Rusi [On the Question of Baptism of
Kievan Russia], in RELiGi I TsERKOv'V IsrOml Rossii, supra note 17, at 16-18; STEES,
supranote 18, at 23. The early Church depended wholly on princes' support because
it was not a popular institution and because early Greek priests could not even
communicate in Russian. Id
See Ragsdale, supra notel6, at 43 (arguing that caesaropapism21.
submission of church to state-historically suited the Russian political model of
overdeveloped, 'hypertrophic' state); STEEvES, supra note 18, at 25-27 (discussing
'symphonia!-a harmony and mutual support between ecclesiastic and secular
authorities in pursuit of a common task of "conducting the people to salvation, on
earth and in heaven).
See STEEvEs, supranote 18, at 25.
22.
See STEEVES, supra note 18, at 32-34. This imagery recurs in relations
23.
between Yeltsin and Alexii II: the Patriarch publicly blessed Yeltsin before his first

presidential campaign in 1990 and since then has figured prominently in Kremlin

ceremonies. See Yeltsin Signs Law to Curb Other Fais,THE BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 27,
1997, at 9A. Yeltsin also appealed to the Orthodox Church for moral support during
August 1991. After short hesitation, Alexii Il threw the whole weight of the church
behind the Yeltsin government See Dennis J. Dunn, Religion, Revolution and Orderin
Russi, in CHRISrIANTY AFIER COMMUNISM, supranote 1, at 24.
See STEEVES, supranote 18, at 31-32.
24.
Id. at 63.
25.
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as "rightful worshippers" (pravoslavnye)implying that everyone
was Greek Orthodox, and that it was the one and only true
religion. 2 6 The sense of self-righteousness was further enhanced
by the notion that Russia had borrowed a doctrinally complete
religion.2 7 This religious dogma obliterated any need for truthseeking and fostered six centuries of a virtual absence of
internecine conflicts, typical of the Catholic Church at the time. 28

In the early sixteenth century, the Church and ambitious
Moscow princes allied to proclaim Moscow the Third and Last
Rome after the fall of Constantinople. 2 9 In politics, this ideology

justified the rapid expansionism of the Moscow state. 30

In

religion, it solidified the Orthodoxy's role as a truly national
church.3 1 Most importantly, it nourished Russian reveries of
grandeur and a special mission 32 in which the Church and
secular rulers collaborated in strengthening Holy Russia and
imparting its most pure religious and national values on all its
subjects as well as beyond its borders.

26.
See RAGSDALE, supra note 16, at 47. There was also a persistent
assumption that all Russian common folk are Christian. The language illustrates this
assumption. For example, "krestianin,"a peasant, is derivative from "krest" a cross
and phonetically is almost identical to "khrest'ann,"aChristian. See iCL
27.
See STEEVES, supra note 18, at 24-25. Russian Orthodoxy recognizes
resolutions of only the first seven ecumenical councils held between 325-787 AD.
28.
See icL Many leading Russian church historians such as George Fedotov
and George Florovsky acknowledged the fact that Russia "had no theology worthy of
the name" and "endured centuries long intellectual silence." RAGSDALE, supranote 16,
at 46. One specialist aptly referred to traditional Orthodoxy as "the absence of books
and the presence of painters," referring to magnificent icons that adorn Orthodox
Churches and to "more sensate spirituality than was true of the more rationalist
theology of the Catholic and Protestant West" Walter Sawatsky, Vjions in Conflict"
Starting Anew Through the Prism of Leadership Training, in CHRISTIANITY AFTER
COMMUNISM, supra note 1, at 114-15. Russian philosophers such as Chaadaev, S.
Bulgakov, V. Soloviev, Iin, Frank, Berdyaev and Meyendorff were the first significant
contributors to the field of theology in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries
but they are little known or followed by the Orthodox hierarchy and clergy.
29.
See STEEVES, supranote 18, at 37-41. For the early political significance of

this doctrine and its historic sources, see Pokrovsky, Moskva-Tretij Rim [Moscow as a
Third Rome], in RELIGIAI TSERKOV' V ISTOR Rossii, supranote 17, at 119-24.
30.
See Ragsdale, supra note 16, at 27 (a Russian version of this manifest
destiny).
31.
See STEEvES, supranote 18, at 40-41.
32.
The monk Philoteus concisely stated the vision that "[a]ll Christian realms
will come to an end and will unite into one single realm of our sovereign" and that also
included an exalted mission to promote the welfare of the whole humanity. See
STEEVES, supranote 18, at 37. The notion of a special mission, or "The Russian Idea,"
remains one of the most popular themes in Russian culture. In fact, it imbued
Russian and Soviet legal norms and led scholars to suggest that Russian society
required not only a sense of direction conveyed by positive law, but also an inspiring
idea or a mission. See Butler, supra note 9, at 26.
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Ironically, Russian expansionism also required the nation to
come in contact with different ethnic groups and religions. The
centuries of cultural and religious isolationism under the Mongol
yoke left Russia completely unprepared to productively
accommodate foreign influences. 3 3 An overriding concern to
preserve Russian Orthodox values insulated Russia from
European developments. 3 4 From the earliest times, the Russian
state projected an intolerance towards foreigners and religious
minorities. 35 For example, medieval Russian rulers symbolically
reflected national xenophobia in the ceremony of washing hands
36
after each official reception of foreign emissaries.

2. The Imperial Period (18th-20th Century)
The reforms and imperial ambitions of Peter the Great (16891725) forced Russia to come face to face with the West.3 7
Culturally, it was a painful experience because it exposed Russia
to competing socio-cultural norms and demonstrated Russian
backwardness,
especially in education,
economics,
and
technology. 3 8 In a truly autocratic manner, Peter ordered Russia
to modernize in a series of ruthless executive decrees.3 9 Peter's
ideal was the Polizeistaat.40 A creature of German political
thought, this model presupposed comprehensive regulation of
every aspect of public and sometimes private life as a way to
mobilize the country's resources and to create "a perfect order" in
a vast, multinational empire. 41
The Orthodox Church also
became an arena for governmental action.
Peter's Spiritual

33.
See, e.g., RAGSDALE, supranote 16, at 48 (explaining the divorce and state
prom society).
34.
See STEEVES, supranote 18, at 63.
35.
For a classic perspective on the fate of religious minorities in Russia since
the Middle Ages, see SERGE BOLSHAKOFF, RUSSIAN NONCONFORMITY: THE STORY OF
"UNOFFICIAL" RELIGION IN RuSSiA (1950). The major schism within the Orthodox Church
occurred in 1652 A.D. as a result of Patriarch Nikon's liturgical reforms. A substantial
group of dissenters, the Old Believers, faced severe persecutions throughout the
centuries. See id. at 46-83. Their derogatory name, the Schismatics, depicts the
Orthodoxy earning for unity and consolidation at the expense of religious pluralism.
Amazingly, the sect survived (probably because of its strong work ethic) and as of 1993,
there were 121 religious associations formed by them. See Berman, supra note 6, at

296 n. 12.
36,
See RAGSDALE, supranote 16, at 26.
37.
Id. at 49-62.
38.
Id
39.
See S.M. SOLOVlEV, CHTENIA I RASSKAZy Po ISTORi Rossii [Readings and
Lectures on Russian History] 520-21, 557-63 (1990), for an apologetic view of Peter's
'large stick' measures by one of the preeminent Nineteenth Century historians.
40.
See RAGSDALE, supranote 16, at 49-59.
41.
Id.
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Regulations promulgated in 1721 made the Church a department
of the state.4 2 The lay official serving as the High Procurator of
the Holy Synod replaced the Patriarch as the leader of the
Church, marking the end to the institutional independence of the
Church. 43 Later, Catherine II solidified administrative control
44
over the Church through sequestration of its lands.
During the imperial period, the rulers exhibited various
degrees
of intolerance
towards
non-Orthodox
religious
confessions. 45 For example, to attract Western entrepreneurs,
and to launch strong educational institutions, Peter was well
disposed to Protestants and Catholics who enjoyed great personal
religious freedom.46 On the other hand, he persecuted domestic
non-conformist movements, such as the Old Believers, and
stressed the importance of ideological uniformity and the
Orthodox supremacy. 4 7 Catherine II, Alexander I, and Alexander
II also flirted with liberal enlightenment ideals including the
freedom of conscience. 48 However, these were fleeting detractions
from the predominant Russian policy summarized by Nicolas I in
three words: "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality. "4 9 As late as
1903, missionary activity by non-Orthodox confessions was still
illegal s and any conversion from the Orthodoxy resulted in
criminal sanctions.5 1 Only in 1905, following great revolutionary
agitation, did the government issue the law on tolerance, which
adopted a more conciliatory posture towards non-Orthodox
52
religious groups.

42.

See STEEVES, supranote 18, at 47-49. A major theme in Peter's decree was

the desirability of religious uniformity. Although Russian rulers were prepared to
enforce this ideal, in practical terms, its achievement was virtually impossible because
of the steady territorial expansion and the incorporation of many non-Russian and
non-Orthodox people into the empire. See also Berman, supra note 6, at 288.
43.

See Steers, supra note 18, at 47.

44.

See ROBERT PIERCE CASEY, RELIGION IN RUSSIA 23 (1946).

45.
See id at 1-27, for a concise overview of imperial religious policies
consistent with the temperaments of individual Russian czars.
46.

See i&. at 13, 31, 37-38.

47.
48.

CASEY, supranote 44, at 19-27.

49.

RAGSDALE,

See STEEVES, supranote 18, at 47-49.

supranote 16, at 80.

50.
See Berman, supranote 6, at 288 & n.3. In Russia, Orthodox theology was
closely afliated with ethnicity. Non-Orthodox Russians betrayed their national
identity and civic duties, and were viewed with hostility and suspicion. Non-Orthodox
non-Russians, such as Jews, Tartars etc., occupied an even lower social status. For a
discussion of persecution of Muslims and Jews in the Russian Empire, see STEEVES,
supranote 18, at 49-55.
51.
See Morozova, supranote 2, at 43.
52.
See Berman, supranote 6, at 288. For a detailed account of this period,
see JOHN SHELTON CURTISS, CHURCH AND STATE IN RUSSIA: THE LASTYEARS OF THE EMPIRE,

1900-1917, 195-235 (1940).
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3. The Soviet Period (1917-1988)
Consistent with Marxist materialism that viewed religion as a
dangerous delusion, the Bolsheviks established the first secular
state in Russian history.5 3 The new scientific atheism was
militant and aggressive. S4
Essentially, the Orthodoxy and
Marxism-Leninism were the two competing faiths.5 5
The
Orthodox Church found itself in an unusual position when the
Soviet legislation gave the latter an upper hand as the official
state doctrine. The laws, passed in 1918 and 1929,56 stripped the
Orthodox Church of its privileged position and placed it on the
same level as all other religions.5 7 The Soviet state tolerated
religions as a "necessary evil," so long as the religious
organizations did not interfere with civil society.
Religious
organizations did not have the rights of a juristic person s
because religion was an entirely personal matter. Accordingly,
the state "relieved" the Church of its properties, its role in
education, and other traditional activities.5 9
The religious
organizations had no redress for this abuse. 60 Even private
religious worship was a risky activity, especially during the 1930s
repression period and under the Criminal Code of 1960.61

53.
54.

See STEEVES, supranote 18 at 65.
See, e.g., Alexander Nezhny, Jadi Topor [Poison and Axe], KULTURA, Nov. 6,

1997, at 7.
55.
See STEEVES, supranote 18, at 65-67.
56.
For selected reprinted provisions and a discussion of the content and
application of these laws, see Nezhny, supranote 54, at 7 (citing archive materials with
secret Politbureau orders, issued in the early 1920s, to crush religious uprisings as
violently as possible and to expropriate the church in the most expedient manner);
STEEVES, supranote 18, at 70-72, 86-87; Berman, supranote 6, at 289-90.

57.
One of the perverse results of this measure was a transitory growth of
minority religions, especially evangelical Protestantism, before Stalin's repression in the
1930". See, e.g., STEEVES, supranote 18, at85; Sawatsky, supranote 18, at 119.
58.
In the U.S.S.R., religious organizations could not engage in charity work,
conduct religious studies, distribute religious literature, establish collection funds, rent

or buy premises and cultic objects for their operations, or conclude agreements and
transactions. See STEEVES, supranote 18, at 70-72.
59.
Id. (reprinting provisions from the "Decree Concerning Separation of
Church From State and School from Church).
60.
Id. at 74-75.
61.
See Dunn, supra note 23, at 18; Berman, supra note 6, at 290-91. In
prosecuting individual believers, the government proceeded under the Criminal Code,
Article 142 (up to three years for violations of separation between the church and the
state and the school from the church by organizing religious assemblies and
instruction) and Article 227 (up to five years for religious activists for damaging public
health, detracting away from civic duties, and proselytizing).

For an interesting

illustration of applying these provisions against Hare Krishna and Jehovah's Witnesses
in the 1970s and 1980s, see Oxana Antic, The Spread of Modem Cults in the USSR, in
RELIGIOUS POLICY INTHE SOVIET UNION 252, 257-68 (Sabrina Petra Ramet ed., 1993).
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During World War II, the Orthodox Church supported the
state by making an appeal to national patriotic sentiments. 6 2 As
a reward, Stalin relented in his uncompromising posture towards
traditional religions.6 3 The state permitted the "election" of a new
Patriarch, but in return created two supervising Councils, one for
the Affairs of the Orthodox Church and the other to supervise
Religious Cults.6
The Councils,6 5 comprised of communist
bureaucrats, dictated religious policies.
For instance, they
ordered five million Eastern Rite Catholics to merge into Russian
Orthodox Church,6 6 outlawed entire religious denominations,6 7
circulated special administrative directives ordering priests to
report their congregates' confessions, 6 8 all while maintaining an
appearance that the USSR complied with the international norms
69
on freedom of conscience.
A religious group had to register with the state to exist
legally. 70 The official registration requirement was a powerful
instrument of state control. When the state perceived certain
religious communities as undesirable for any reason, it simply
refused to register them.7 1 Any activities by such unregistered

It is noteworthy that the Soviet regime perceived religious belief as a mental
sickness and for many victims the punishment was not prison but mental institution
where the inmates were often subjected to physical and mental torture (from the
author's conversations with people who survived pslwhushki-mental hospitals).
62.
See STEEVES, supra note 18, at 94.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 98.
65.
The above mentioned two councils later merged into an omnipotent
Council for Religious Affairs. For a comprehensive study of the operations of the
Council for Religious Affairs, see Otto Luchterhandt, The Counmdfor ReligiousAffairs, in
RELIGIOUS POLICY INTHE SOVIET UNION, supranote 6 1, at 55-83.
66.
For a fascinating history of this religious community that has Orthodox
liturgy but is under the Pope's dominion, see Bohdan Bociurkiw, Politics and Religion in
Ukraine: the Orthodox and the Greek Cathoics, in THE POLITCS OF RELIGION 131, supra
note 12, at 135.
67.
For example, all Protestant groups that did not belong to the official
centralized All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists (AUCECB) were
outlawed. See Walter Sawatsky, Protestan srn in the USSR, in RELIGIOUS POLICY INTHE
SOVIET UNION, supranote 61, at 328-29.
68.
See STEEVES, supranote 18, at 144-45 (discussing the moral dilemma of
becoming a registered religious organization).
69.
Id. at 105. See also JA. Hebly, The State, the Church, and the Okumene:
the Russian Orthodox Church and the World Council of Churches, 1948-1985, in
RELIGIOUS POLICY IN THE SovIET UNION, supra note 61, at 105-21. The Soviet state
allowed the Orthodox Church to build relations with foreign religious entities and
exploited the Orthodox presence on the international religious arena for its own
interests.
70.
See STEEVEs, supranote 18, at 142-45.
71.
For example, while large traditional denominations were usually successful
in obtaining registration enabling them to sponsor group worship, non-traditional
sects, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, Hare Krishna, some Adventists, Pentecostals,
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groups resulted in criminal and civil sanctions to their
Some religious groups consciously chose not to
members. 7 2
register to signify their protest against the state control of
73
religious organizations.
Overall, the Soviet legacy did not introduce liberal ideals on
the separation of church and state. Dejure separation translated
into tremendous legal disabilities for religious organizations and
did not diminish the pervasive state control of religious activities.
Intolerance was still a central feature. The only difference was

the substitution of the 74Orthodox Church with scientific atheism
and Marxism-Leninism.

B. TraditionalMoral Theory
Unique moral ideals recurrent throughout Russian history
led to the development of religious policies that were different
from other Western societies. The effect of the 1997 law will
depend on the extent to which Russia follows these traditional
determinants:
Autocracy and All-Encompassing State Control
Lack of the Inalienable Rights Concept
Great Affinity Between the Church and State
Orthodoxy as a Part of Russian National
Identity
5. Xenophobia
1.
2.
3.
4.

Historians argued that an overly-developed state mechanism
(hypotrophic state) was Russia's way of withstanding foreign
invasion by mobilizing the resources of a population spread over
vast wilderness. The state's control over its people was absolute,
and inalienable individual rights were superfluous. In contrast to
Western Europe, where human rights evolved from the rights and

Baptists, and even those Orthodox Christians -who opposed officially recognized
leadership, faced insurmountable difficulties at the registration stage. Id at 42.
72.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144-45.
73.
74.
N. Berdyaev was the first proponent of the theory that there was a great
continuity between communism and the traditional 'Russian Idea' associated with the
Orthodoxy. See generally NICOLAS BERDYAEV, THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN COMMUNISM (R.M.
French trans., 2d ed. 1948). The author argued that both Holy and Communist Russia
were inspired by a strong sense of a historical mission, going back to the Moscow as
the Third Rome theory. Other scholars elaborated on the theme and noted a number
of graphic similarities between communist and religious rituals, educational and public
relations strategies, as well as adherence to one dominant ideology to the detriment of
all other beliefs. See, e.g., STEEVES, supra note 18, at 111-19 and 136; HAROLD J.
BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 229 (1963), reprinted in THE INrEGRATIVE
JURISPRUDENCE OF HAROLD J. BERMAN, supranote 9, at 26.
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responsibilities of feudal classes (or estates) and were extended to
individuals during the Enlightenment, Russia never developed the
notion of human rights. 75 In Russia, a sovereign could grant or

revoke privileges (not rights!) at will. 76 The sovereign was the
77

ultimate source of all benefits and the people's protector.
Depending on personality, a ruler could be a reformer and even
the most progressive force in society.78
The Orthodox Church had a preeminent place because of its
collaboration with rulers.7 9 Their mission was identical: survival
of Holy Russia and the attainment of a special place for its
heritage among nations.8 0 In an effort to achieve this goal, the
Church was responsible for keeping Russia spiritually pure and
the state provided for its physical continuity. 8 ' Although the
early
Orthodox Church did enjoy some institutional
independence, it grew accustomed to persistent state interference
in its internal affairs, and doctrinally accepted rulers as a higher
8 2 In return, it received a monopoly as
authority (caesaropapism).
83
the official state religion.
Moreover, in a thousand year period,
the Orthodoxy became a part of Russian ethnic identity. 8 4 The
Soviet state deprived the Orthodoxy of its privileged position but
retained absolute control over religious affairs. 85 Thus, even if
Russia witnessed the most radical exclusion of religion from
public life, it never experienced a Western-type 8 6 separation of
church and state.

75.

See Ragsdale, supranote 16, at 31-27.

76.

Id.

77.

Building upon this historical contingency, the present Russian Constitution

confers upon the President the role of the "guarantor of human rights." KONST. RF.,
supra note 10, at art 80(2). Acting in this capacity, President Yeltsin symbolically
announced 1998 to be a Year of Human Rights. See Oleg Moroz, Not'u Zakon o
Svobode Sovesti Stavit na Etoj Svobode Krest [The New Law on Freedom of Conscience
Crosses this Freedom Out], LrTERATURNAYA GAzEnA, July 23, 1997, at 3. Unfortunately,
entrusting the fate of human rights to the head of the executive branch and not to the
judiciary creates theoretical difficulties for enforcing human rights through courts. For
example, the Constitutional Court may lack political legitimacy to strike down a law
prepared by the executive staff that patently violates human rights because the
executive, by definition, is the supreme guarantor of these rights. As the Note reveals,
this is also one of the problems with the Law on Freedom of Conscience.
78.
See RAGSDALE, supra note 16, at 58-59 & n.13, 70-71 (citing Natan
Eidelman's famous thesis of "revolution from above," a common way to initiate changes
in a largely inert Russian society).
79.
See supranotes 20, 21 and accompanying text
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
See suprapart ilA (1-2).
84.
Id.
85.
See supraPart IIA(3).
86. See discussion supranote 15.
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Finally, Russia was very protective of its cultural and
religious
idiosyncrasies.8 7
Accepting
the
Orthodoxy
or

communism as the ultimate truth, it had little tolerance for other
creeds. 88 Russia had a tendency to indulge in extremes: the
utmost moral fervor and idealism did not countenance any
compromises and pluralism.8 9 Convinced of its moral superiority,
and at the same time humiliated and intimidated by more
successful 9° foreigners, Russians developed an acute xenophobia
that was not conducive to cultural and religious diversity.
Religious and ethnic minorities were powerless pawns 91 subjected
to both violent pogroms9 2 and persecution of the "flirtations with
God " 9 3 by the Soviet regime.

III.

INTRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA

In the late 1980s Soviet Prime Minister Gorbachev introduced
momentous political and social reforms. The role of religion and
the Orthodox Church became a prominent issue, especially due to
the celebration of the millennium of Christianity in Russia. 9 4 A
great religious revival permeated all strata of society. More people
identified themselves as believers.9 5 Soviet writers, artists, and

87.
See supraPart IIA, passiM.
88.
Id
89.
Id.
90.
As author Tatyana Tolstaya stated "Scornful of Western materialism,
Russians have mocked the English with their machines, the Germans with their order
and precision, the French with their logic, and finally the Americans with their love of
money. As a result, in Russia we have neither machines, nor order, nor logic, nor
money."' See Pankhurst, supranote 1, at 82.
91.
The popular political adage men'shinstva podchiniautsia bol'shistvuminorities are subservient to the majority-well summarizes this national attitude in all

spheres of life.
92.
For a discussion of anti-Semitism and pogroms, see STEEVES, supra note
18, at 52-55. Violent anti-Semitism has become a growing threat since the late 1980s,
particularly in conjunction with celebrating a millennium the Christening of the
Russia. The militia specifically warned the Jewish community in Moscow that it will
not be able to protect its members if they traveled outside of the city. See also Nielsen,
Introduction, CHRISnANrrYAFrER COMMUNIsM, supranote 1, at 10-12.
93.
V. Lenin coined this phrase referring to the inherent insincerity and
unjusifiability of religious beliefs. See Nezhny, supranote 54, at 7.
94.
SeeBourdeaux, supranote 12, at 114.
95.
The statistics on religious believers in the Soviet Union and Russia are
confusing. In 1988, a Soviet-American study showed that only ten percent of the
population believed in God. See Nielsen, supranote 59, at 5. The Russian Academy of
Science reported that the number rose twenty-nine percent in 1990 and forty-one
percent in 1993. Id. However, these signs of religious revival may be misleading. In
the USSR people were afraid to publicly acknowledge their faith because of numerous
negative repercussions such an admission could generate. At best, believing in God
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filmmakers openly pursued religious motifs. 9 6 In popular culture,
religion was no longer a sign of cultural and social backwardness,
but of "civic boldness" 97 and liberalism. People hoped that the

newly-found faith would bring moral, spiritual, and ethical
salvation as well as material rewards. 98 Given its history, the
Orthodox Church expected to monopolize this spiritual

awakening.
Significantly, Gorbachev admitted the mistakes with handling
religious affairs in the past and promised to enact new legislation
on freedom of conscience that would meet the highest
international legal standards in regard to both individual rights
and the status of religious organizations.9 9 Although the Soviet
Union always professed a respect for international instruments on
human rights, this was the first time a Soviet leader actually
intended to enforce international norms. The newly-independent
Russia continued to follow liberal international norms, and
enacted domestic legislation consistent with these practices. The
next section elaborates on the early impact of international
religious rights principles in Russia.

was ridiculed as cultural backwardness, at worst, as a psychiatric problem and civic
misconduct. If one wanted to advance in society, one never admitted his faith.
Gorbachev's "glasnost"reformed the stature of religion and people no longer feared to
report their religious predilections. Thus, some observers have argued that the
number of believers remained virtually unchanged or, at least, did not rise as
dramatically as the numbers above suggest Instead, it was a process of coming out of
personal suppression. See, e.g., Berman, supranote 6, at 291 (estimating that even in
the 1970s around forty percent were religious believers).
96.
For example, the repentance and spiritual rejuvenation theme was
explored by Chingiz Aitmatov in his novel Plakha[The Executioner's Block] (1987). It is
reflected in monumental paintings by Ilya Glazunov, who is heavily influenced by the
aesthetics of Orthodox icons. It is prominent in the most acclaimed film of the late
1980' Pokayanie[The Repentance] in which the last shot depicts a wise old Georgian
woman stating that all roads eventually lead to "the Temple." In fact, the polls revealed
that twenty-nine percent of believers listed TV, newspapers and magazines as the
source of their new conviction, thirty-one percent were swayed by literature. Only
twenty-one percent listed the Bible and other religious literature as their main
influence and nine percent credited their beliefs to church ceremonies, preaching, and
conversations with clergy. See Nielsen, supranote 92, at 5.

97.

STEEM, supranote 18, at 193.

98.
For an insider account of this phenomenon by a liberal Orthodox
theologian, see Vsevolod Chaplin, The Church and Politics in ContemporaryRussia, in
THE POLITICS OF RELIGION, supranote 12, at 95, 100-01 (arguing that the Church should
avoid becoming heavily involved in politics and gaining power and influence through
this process. However, a complete renunciation of its public role would also be
irresponsible because people need spiritual guidance in dealing with the problems "of
this world." Therefore, the Church must search for a middle ground).
99.
See Berman, supranote 6, at 293 (citing Gorbachev's speech to the U.N. in
December, 1988).
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A. The Sources and Standardsof International

Law on Religious Human Rights
Russia inherited all Soviet obligations under international
treaties and agreements in the area of religious human rights.
Several instruments provide essential standards in this area
including: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights; ° ° the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental

Freedoms;' 0

1

the

U.N.

Declaration

on

the

Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination

of
Based on Religious Beliefs;10 2 and the Concluding Document
03
'
Representatives.
CSCE
the
of
Meeting
Follow-Up
Vienna
the
In the international regime, every human being has a right to
enjoy personal freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This

100. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1976) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Covenant]. The USSR ratified the
Covenant on October 16, 1973. See CENTRE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS: STATUS OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 27 Sales No.E.87.XIV.2 (1987). Thus, the rules in the
Covenant are the law of the land in Russia. For a discussion of the status of
international norms in Russia, see supranote 13.
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
101.
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept 3, 1953), as
amended by Protocol Nos 3 & 4 [hereinafter Convention]. When Russia became a
member of the Council of Europe on February 28, 1996, it undertook extensive human
rights obligations under the Convention. As a part of its membership package, Russia
had to ratify the Convention and implement its norms through domestic legislation
that would enable individuals to sue under the international rules. It also subjected
Russia to the mandatory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. For a
discussion of the problems with CE membership, see L.N. Shestakov, Rossia-Chlen
Soueta Evropy: Nekotorye Pravouye Voprosy [Russia as a Member of the Council of
Europe: Some Legal Issues], in 4 VESNIK MOSKOVSKOGO UNrVERsrrA PRAVO 61, 67-71
(1997) (arguing that the invitation to join the CE was premature and that now Russia is
legally boundby the CE human rights standards expressed in the Convention).
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
102.

Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief, adopted 18 Jan. 1982, GA. Res. 55, 36
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. a/RES/36/55 (1982) [hereinafter Declaration].
The Declaration is an exhortatory document that is not legally binding. Yet, it provides
a comprehensive catalogue of religious rights and is an authoritative distillation of
world opinion on religious liberty. See De BurghtReport, supranote 6, at 20. Also, the
Declaration may have greater legitimacy in Russia because the USSR was one of its
active drafters and proponents.
103. Concluding Document of the 1986 Vienna Meeting of Representatives of
the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Jan
17, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 527 (1989) [hereinafter Vienna Concluding Document]. CSCE
(OSCE) commitments, by their terms, do not constitute formal legal obligations, such
as the Covenant and the Convention. However, they are politically binding and act as
the most recent addition to customary ("soi) international law on religious rights. See
Durham, supra note 14, at 37 & n.77. Under the 1993 Russian Constitution, the
norms in the Vienna document may have a substantial, direct effect in Russia through
Articles 17(1) and 18 (providing that "universally recognized" principles of human
rights shall have "direct force" as well as "determine the meaning, content and
implementation" of domestic legislation).
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includes a right to have, adopt, or freely change religious beliefs,
and to profess any religion either individually or in community
with others.'04 These guarantees of personal (internal) freedom of
conscience are absolute and inalienable. On the other hand, a
state can circumscribe

the right to

manifest one's religion or

beliefs in worship, teaching, practice, or observance.' 0 5 However,
any such limitations must be strictly necessary to protect an
exhaustive list of recognized interests in a democratic state:
public safety and order, health, morals,10 6 and the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.1° 7 The European Court of Human
Rights has further defined the scope of such limitations when it
ruled that any interference with broadly construed religious rights
must be "motivated by 'a pressing social need' and 'must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.'" 108 For example,
the Court found that the Greek government failed to meet this
exacting standard when it placed significant constraints on
10 9
proselytizing efforts by Jehovah's Witnesses.
Another important principle in international religious human
rights is the equality of all persons before the law and the
prohibition of discrimination based on religion.11 0 The scope of
this provision is subject to debate.
If religion takes on its

104.

See Covenant, supranote 100, at art. 18(1); Convention, supra note 101, at

art. 9(1).
105.
See Covenant, supranote 100, at art. 18(3); Convention, supranote 101, at
art 9(2).
106.
Limitations that have as their purpose the protection of morals must not be
based on principles deriving exclusively from a single tradition. See De Burght Report,
supranote 6, at 15 & n.34 (citing General Comment No. 22(48) of the Human Rights
Committee, an international body responsible for supervising states' compliance with
the Covenant).
107.
See Covenant, supranote 100, at art. 18(1); Convention, supra note 101, at
art. 9(1) (protecting religious freedom); De BurghtReport, supranote 6, at 14.
108.
De Burght Report, supra note 6, at 17 & n.38 (quoting Case of Silver and
Others, 61 Eur. CL H.R. (ser. A) at 38 (1983) (emphasis added)).
109. Kokldnakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) 18 (1993). Proselytizing
was defined as speaking about religious beliefs with a non-believer in that individual's
home, or even attempting to sell religious literature. For a comment on the case and
an overview of litigation on religious rights in the European Court of Human Rights,
see T. Jeremy Gunn, AdjudicatingRights of Conscience Under the European Convention

on HumanRights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS INA GLOBAL PERSPECrIVE, supranote 6, at
305-30.
110.
See Declaration, supranote 102, at arts. 2, 3, 4. The Declaration's main
focus is on the prohibition of religious discrimination and intolerance. Article 2(2)
defines discrimination as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based
on religion or belief and having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment
of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms
on an equal basis." Such discrimination is prohibited when perpetrated by or against
.any state, institutions, group of persons or person." See also Vienna Concluding
Document, supra note 103, at 533; De Burght Report, supra note 6 at 20-26
(commenting on the Vienna Concluding Document).
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broadest meaning, 111 a state must treat both individuals and
religious institutions equally, regardless of denomination. The
Vienna Concluding Document buttresses this reading when it
links equal rights for religious groups to individual freedom to
profess any religion. For example, the Document calls on states
to take effective measures to eliminate discrimination against
individuals or communities exercising religious beliefs, to foster a
climate of mutual tolerance and respect, and to grant upon
2
request the recognition of legal status to religious groups."
Such status affords numerous accessory rights such as the ability
to: solicit and receive voluntary contributions; have independent
governing structures; have access to real property for assembly
and worship; consult with other religious institutions; have an
opportunity to provide religious education and training; and to
produce, import, and disseminate religious publications and
materials." 3 Moreover, the Human Rights Committee explicitly
voiced its concerns about any tendencies to discriminate against
newly-established religions or religious minorities.114
Nevertheless, there are numerous permutations" s on
church-state relations in Europe, and most of them reflect the
deep historical roots of preferential treatment for one particular
The European Court of Human Rights explicitly
religion.
assented to the proposition that the State Church system does
not, in and of itself, violate Article 9 of the Convention, 1 16 and has
repeatedly showed institutional bias in favor of traditional
religions. 1 1 7
Although religious policies of certain Western

111. Religious human rights encompass both individual and institutional rights.
The latter are derived from individual liberty to pursue religion in groups. See supra
note 104 and accompanying text. For example, Comment 22(48) to the Covenant
"clarified that freedom to manifest one's religion includes 'acts integral to the conduct
by religious groups... [including] freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools
and freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts." De Burght Report, supranote 6,
at 16 (also quoting Covenant, supranote 100, at art. 9(1)) (emphasis added). Also,

Articles 1-6 of the Declaration set out a lengthy catalogue of religious rights including
the right to worship or assemble and to maintain places for these purposes; to
establish charitable organizations; to own property and cultic objects; to publish, write
and disseminate religious materials; to provide religious education; to train, appoint,
and elect leaders; to maintain contacts with international religious organizations. See
iL at 18.
112. See Vienna Concluding Document, supranote 103, at 534.
113. Seei).
114. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22(48) concerning
Article 18 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 4, Sept 27 1993) reprinted in De Burght Report,
supranote 6, at 15.
115. See Berman, supranote6, at XV.
116. See Darby Case, 187 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1990); see also Gunn,
supranote 109, at 312.
117. SeeGunn, supranote 109, at 312.
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European states also evoked the sharp criticism of observers, l""
the specialists agree that cooperative and endorsed models of
church-state relations
generally achieve international religious
1 19
liberty standards.

B. PredominantParadigmsof Church-StateRelations in Europe
Due to geopolitical and developmental differences, European
notions of the role of church and religion usually differ from those
in the United States. With the exception of France, European
models of church-state relations are more similar to the Russian
tradition than to the American First Amendment ideals. Thus,
even though the 1997 law was shocking to American religious
rights analysts, its thrust is consistent with the European
models. The next section describes several of these models.
1. Cooperationist-Germany
Germany is the prime example of a country in which the
secular state cooperates with religious organizations. The State
provides these organizations with material and other types of
support. 120 Religion also has a distinct place in civil society, and
the state sponsors religious education. 12 1 The state does not
directly endorse any religion, and officially all religions are equal
and entitled to the same state support. 12 2 However, this model
raises practical problems of inadvertent or even intentional state
preferences for certain religions and excessive intrusion into

118.

For example, Germany was cited with criticism in a U.S. State Department

review on the treatment of Christians around the world. See Steven Lee Meyers, Word
for Word/Religious Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1997, at 7. Recently, a federal
administration court in Berlin denied Jehovah's Witnesses the status of a "public body"
on the grounds that the church did not offer "indispensable loyalty" towards the state
when it refused to acknowledge public elections. Moreover, Mormons and Seventh
Day Adventists are also listed in Western European parliamentary reports as
"dangerous sects." See Eperts Warn of Growing Intolerance of Minority Religions in
Europe, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS. In Belgium, Quakers,
Hasidic Jews, and even the YMCA were labeled as "cults." Swiss authorities are
considering legislation to criminally prosecute "mind control." In response to this
disquieting news, the U.S. Senate had a special hearing on religious intolerance in the
OSCE states. See Religious Intolerance in Europe Today-Hearing Tomorrow, PR
NEWSwIRE, Sept. 17, 1997.
119.
See Durham, supranote 14, at 24.
120.
See generally Emily A. Moseley, Note, Defining Religious Tolerance: German
Policy Toward the Churchof Scientology, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 1129, 1153 (1997).
121.
Id. at 1143-45; Durham, supra note 14, at 20.
122.
See Durham, supranote 14, at 21.
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religious affairs.123 For example, the practice of state recognition

of some beliefs as religious and others as not meriting such status
led to abridged rights and discrimination-especially against new
confessions.

Scholars have suggested that Russia needs to adopt certain
aspects of the cooperationist approach in order to redeem the
damage to religious institutions by the Soviet regime. They
recommend a transitional period during which the state will
restore expropriated properties to religious organizations. 124 The
risk is that Russian traditional moral theory will pervert this
paradigm, and the state will indulge in impermissible favoritism
and interventionism.
2. Endorsement-Spain
Historic state ties to one predominant religion may lead the
state to endorse that religion while still proclaiming separation.
Spain, a bastion of Catholicism, provides for such special
recognition of this religion.1 25 In its most enlightened form, this
model reflects national pride when it recognizes a special historic
place for a particular religion without providing further
advantages to it. When a state assures equal protection to all
religious groups, it balances national moral needs with the
international principles of religious equality. However, in many
states, a symbolic endorsement is inseparable from an actual
preservation of prerogatives of formerly established religions
under a liberal disguise.' 26 In Russia, the endorsement model
would accommodate Russian national sentiments, but Russian
history alerts one to potential gross abuses of this arrangement.
The current political strength of the Patriarchate 12 7 only
exacerbates the worst suspicions of the Orthodox monopoly.
123.

Moseley, supranote 120, at 1154-55 (contrasting the text of the Basic Law

with its practical application).
124. See Durham, supranote 14, at 21; John Witte, Jr. Religious Human Rights
in the World Today: A Report on the 1994 Atlanta Conference: IntroductoryRemarks, 10
EMORY INT'L L.R. 53, 57-58 (1996) (describing a self-assumed cultural obligation by the
state to assist religious institutions to make amends for the communist past).
125.
See Durham, supranote 14, at 20.
126. Id.

127. Before 1993, a number of individual churchmen were elected as people's
deputies. See Chaplin, supra note 98, at 100. Moreover, a few Orthodox activists
formed a Christian Democratic Party which actively identified with religious ideals and
aimed to assume the role of chief representative of the Orthodox Church. For a history
of the evolution of this party from moderately liberal to nationalistic, see Paul D.
Steeves, ChristianDemocratsin Russia, in CHRISTIANTY AMTER COMMUNISM, supranote 1,
at 63-74. Since 1993 the Patriarchate officially eschewed direct participation in
politics, and the Holy Synod issued a resolution that prohibited priests from running
for a representative office on the penalty of defrocldng. See Chaplin, supranote 98, at
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3. Established Church-England
There are variations within the established church model
ranging from the state enforced monopoly of one religion to the
most democratic English arrangement. In the English experiment,
the Anglican Church is historically inseparable from the state and
has a prominent place in all spheres of public life. 128 However,
the state also guarantees equal treatment of all other religious
beliefs. This model is not desirable for Russia where there is no
culturally ingrained respect for individual human rights, and the
record of the established Church period abounds with examples of
egregious inequality and intolerance.
D. Late Soviet and Early RussianProgressive
Religious Legislation (1990-1993)
The above-mentioned international principles of religious
rights informed late Soviet and early Russian domestic legislation.
In the Russian legal scheme, the international norms are selfexecutory because Russia subscribes to monism in the areas of

political and social human rights. 129 Moreover, the enactment of
domestic legislation consistent with the international norms
further enhanced their status. The concept of universal human
rights emerged as a clear rival to the traditional Russian moral
history.
1. The Religious Laws of 1990
Gorbachev fulfilled his promise to match the highest religious
human rights standards with a federal "Law on Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organizations" promulgated in 1990.130

111. However, the indirect influence of the Patriarchate remains significant as the
process of adopting the 1997 religious law demonstrates. A colorfully despicable
nationalist Russian politician, V. Zhirinovsky, summarized the situation by confessing

"if the Patriarch tells us to vote for some version of the bill--wel oblige, and if he tells
us not to vote-we won'tI" See Ivan Rodin, Prinyat Novyj Variant Zakona o Svobode

Sovesti [A New Version of the Law on the Freedom of Conscience is Adopted],
NEZAvisIMAYA GAZETA, Sept 20, 1997.

128. For example, 26 senior Anglican Bishops sit in the House of Lords and its
institutional establishment continues even though only sixteen percent of English
population are actively religious, as opposed to forty-three percent of Americans and
seventy-eight percent of Irish. See generaly Peter Cumper, Religious Liberty in the
United Kingdom, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS INGLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 205, supra note 6,
at 205, 217-20.
129.
See supranote 10, 101 and accompanying text.
130.
0 SVOBODE SovEsl I RELIGIOZNYKH ORGANIZATSIIAKH' [On Freedom of

Conscience and Religious Organizations], Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR, 1990, no. 41, item
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The law closely tracked the language of the Covenant and the
Convention in defining the freedom of religion. Specifically, it
adopted the international bifurcated approach with an absolute
freedom of personal convictions and very narrow limitations on
the exercise of religion. 13 1 The law retained the separation
between church and state, but permitted religious organizations
to become juristic persons upon registration.13 2 As legal entities,
religious organizations received crucial rights such as the ability
to own property, to provide religious education, to distribute
religious literature, and many other rights denied to them during
the Soviet times.
At the same time, the Russian Federation passed its own law
"On Freedom of Religion." 133 Russian law contained an even
more impressive list of liberal provisions 13 4 protecting religious
freedom. The Preamble recognized freedom of conscience and an
opportunity to exercise it as inalienable rights.1 3 5 The law
explicitly extended these religious rights, including the right to
form religious organizations, to foreigners. The law also provided
for a more equitable registration procedure and a process 1for
36
judicial appeal if the state refused to register an organization.
In sharp contrast to Soviet laws, the Ministry of Justice could
reject a registration application only if it failed to meet certain
basic requirements specified in the law or if the organization was

otherwise unlawful. 137 These easy, mechanical requirements led
to the registration of 9,489 religious associations of various
denominations by September 1993.138 Even by the most exacting
standards, before the collapse of the USSR, the Russian
Federation had one of the most progressive religious policies in
the world. 139

813 [hereinafter 1990 USSR Law] An English translation appears in 33 J. OF CHURCH
& STATE 191-201.
131. See id at arts. 3-4.
132. See id at arts. 5, 13, 15.
133. See 1990 RUSSIAN LAW, supranote 6.
134. See Berman, supranote 6, at 295-297 (comparing the Soviet and Russian
Laws of 1990 and pointing out greater religious protections in the Russian Law
including an affirmation of supremacy of both customary and treaty-based
international religious rights norms).
135. See 1990 RUSSIAN LAW, supranote6.
136. Id at art. 20.
137. Id.
138. See Berman, supranote 6, at 296 & n.12 (listing registered confessions).
139. But see LAWY'ERS' COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL
REFORM IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 9-10 (1993) (noting significant limitations on
religious liberty, especially in the USSR law pertaining to registration, and continued
criminalization of religious activities in the Criminal Code).
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2. Religious Human Rights and the Russian Constitution of 1993
The newly-independent Russia continued to build an
exemplary legislative and practical record in the field of religious
human rights. Unable to reach a political compromise to
promulgate a new Constitution, the Parliament speedily passed
the Declaration of Rights and Freedoms of an Individual and
Citizen in late 1991.140
Although not legally binding, this
document demonstrated dedication to the democratic concept of
inalienable human rights, including the right to freedom of
14 1
conscience in its broadest sense.
Finally, the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted
by the popular referendum in December 1993, marks the apex in
Russia's quest to implement the norms derived from international
human rights sources. The Constitution radically departs from
the traditional moral theory, and treats religious rights in the
most liberal way. Article 14 proclaims Russia a secular state, and
states that "no religion may be established as the State religion or
as obligatory."142
The article further states that "religious

associations shall be separate from the state and shall be equal
before law."143
The Constitution also embraces an expansive' 4 4 view of
religion and individual religious liberties. For example, Article 28

140.

DEKLARATSIIA PRAV I SVOBOD CHELOVEKA I GRAZHDANINA [Declaration

of

Rights and Freedoms of the Individual and Citizen], Nov. 22, 1991 adopted by
POSTANOVLENIE VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA RSFSR 0 DEKIARATSII PRAY I SVOBOD CHELOVEKA I
GRAZHDANINA [Resolution of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the Declaration of Rights
and Freedoms of the Individual and Citizen], Nov. 22, 1991, Ross. Gazeta, Dec. 25,
1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, Russica File, as the Declaration of Human Rights and
Civil Liberties.
141.
See KONS?. RF, supra note 10, at art. 1 (inalienable rights, supremacy of
international human rights norms); art. 3 (equality before the law regardless of one's
attitude towards religion); art. 13 (freedom of thought, speech, seeking or imparting
information); art. 14 (freedom of religion, both individual beliefs and their
manifestation).
142.
Id.
143.
Id. at art. 14(2).
144.
The basic provision that addresses freedom of conscience tracks the
language of the Russian Declaration of Human Rights (article 14) and is very close to
the generic text in the international documents. Compare this with Covenant, supra
note 100, at art. 18(1) and Convention, supranote 101, at art. 9(1). The only patent
difference is that the constitutional text does not list specific activities included in the
concept of !manifesting' one's religion, such as worship, teaching, practice, and
observance. Instead, article 28 of the Russian Constitution allows everyone to "freely
choose, possess and disseminate religious and other convictions and act in accordance
with them." KONST. RF, supranote 10, at art. 28. Although the Russian text on its face
adopts a somewhat broader definition of individual religious liberty than the
comparable international instruments-in particular, the Russian text provides for an
explicit right to be an atheist-a lack of specificity in vaguely allowing people to act in
accordance with their beliefs gives the state an opportunity to define religious liberty in
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affirms each person's right to "freedom of conscience and religion,
including the right to profess individually or collectively any
religion or not to profess any religion, and freely to choose,
possess or disseminate religious and other convictions and act in
accordance with them."146 The specific freedom of religion is
buttressed by a general freedom of thought and speech provision
in

Article

29.146

Article 29 also prohibits propaganda that

arouses religious hatred or preaches religious supremacy. 147

However, there is a caveat at the end of the Human and Civil
Rights Chapter of the Russian Constitution.

Article 55 allows

limitations 148 on these freedoms by federal law only to the extent

domestic legislation. Unfortunately, the 1997 law denies the freedom of religious
education to some organizations. See infra, Part IVD(4)(viii).
145. See KONST. RF, supranote 10, at art 28.
146. See id.
147. See id. at art. 29(2). There was some criticism of this provision because the
propaganda of supremacy is such a vague concept For example, would the Orthodox
"Russian Idea" described above, or a group of communists shouting the slogans of the
supremacy of the Proletariat at the metro station, qualify as constitutional violators?
Political culture makes such results unlikely, and yet constitutional language seems to
permit them. See Korkeakivi, supranote 10, at 236 & n.37.
148. One of the critical distinctions between the Russian Constitution and the
international religious liberty regime is the state's indiscriminate ability to limit human
rights through Article 55(3). See Korkeakivi, supra note 10, at 233-34 & nn.22-23.
Thus, there is no bifurcated approach exhibited by the international instruments in
which the government may only limit manifestation of religion (free exercise) but not
individual (internal) beliefs. Although this omission may not have a direct practical
effect because, as the Soviet experience demonstrated, it is almost impossible for the
government to control one's soul, the provision, nonetheless, potentially allows Russia
to outlaw some faiths as dangerous and deny constitutional protections to their
followers even when they do not manifest their beliefs. This provision invites
classifications of faiths into religious ones versus "totalitarian," "mind-controlling" cults,
and provides an excuse for crushing the latter. The current Russian experience shows
that the Russian public and politicians are quick to engage in making such
classifications. For example, the sponsor of the 1997 bill, V. Zorkaltsev, refers to
Baptists and Protestants as "proper" religions and Hare Krishna as "improper." See
Andy Bowers, Regulating Russian Religions, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, NPR, Sept 19,
1997, transcript available in LEXIS, News Library, International File; Mikhail Ivanov,
Auditing the Soul ofRussia, RUSSIAN LIFE [Monthly], Sept. 1997, at 6, 9, 11 (expressing
distrust of the "improper beliefs" of Scientologists who allegedly infiltrated the Russian
military-industrial complex and of Mormons who allegedly steal public records from
the archives and perform religious rituals over the souls of the deceased). This article
is the prime example of the Russian moderate position and is an excellent cultural
illustration of "the pieces in the puzzle" in the dilemma of choosing between a genuine
religious liberty and pluralism, and security considerations. Even though the author
dismisses the most paranoid stories about non-traditional beliefs, there is still a
marked discomfort with the proliferation of "cults." Other best known "cults" include
the Boston Church of Christ, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Unification Church, Sahaji
Yoga, Transcendental Meditation, Brahma Kumaris, and the so-called "prosperity"
theology such as the Word of Life. See ic. at 8. See also Dina Usupova, Okhota na
Ved'm s Lizenziej Gosdumy [A Witch Hunt licensed by the State Duma, Oct 1998,
OGONEK no. 40, at 27-29 (noting the intensification of an anti-cult campaign, and in
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necessary for the protection of the basis of the constitutional
order, morality, health, rights and lawful interests of other people,
and for ensuring the defense of the country and the security of
the state. 14 9 Article 56 deals with a state of emergency and an
abridgment of certain liberties for that reason. However, the state
may not restrict freedom of conscience, as defined in Article 28,
even in such emergency situation. I50

IV. THE 1997 LAW "ON FREEDOM

OF CONSCIENCE
AND RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS"

The tremendous social and economic changes in Russia over
the last several years have generated a sense of instability that
conservatives utilized to introduce restrictions on religious liberty.
Ironically, the former rivals, Orthodox Church and communists,
151
allied as the primary sponsors of the new religious legislation.
This section begins with an exploration of the domestic
imperatives that caused Russia to deviate from its international
obligations and constitutional guarantees. The potency of these
forces will determine the interpretation of the new law and the
scope of its actual enforcement. The remainder of this section
analyzes the text of the new law through both normative and
hypothetical discussions. In addition to explaining the structure
of the law and its potential effects on the religious rights of
individuals and religious organizations, the discussion highlights
inconsistencies between the new law and the norms of
constitutional and international law. These norms can serve as
the basis for legal challenges in Russian and European courts.
A. The Hardshipsof Religious Pluralism
The surge of excitement that initially accompanied the liberal
freedom of conscience legislation dissipated in light of numerous
socio-economic problems that Russia faced as it struggled to build

particular, the courts' willingness to review the allegations of "zombying" and other
types of"anti-social" activities by the so-called sects. Despite a lack of foundation in

most such claims, the courts usually adopt a strong anti-cultist posture and allow
groundless allegations into evidence. Many regions have already set up "psychiatric
rehabilitation" centers for the alleged victims of"zombying).
149.
SeeKONST. RF., supranote 10, at art 55(3).
150.
See id. at art. 56(3).
151.
One of the best known liberal deputies, Galina Starovoitova, referred to the
law as the plot between communists and reactionaries in the Patriarchate. See Prinyat
Novyj Zakon o Svobode Sovesti [The New Law on Freedom of Conscience Has Been
Passed],Lzzsm, Sept 20, 1997, at 1.
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a democratic society and a market economy. I5 2 Unaccustomed to
religious pluralism, Russians were ill-equipped to deal with a
"market place of faiths"' 5 3 with each confession offering a long
awaited spiritual and ethical renewal. At the same time, Russia
also was widely exposed to a "nihilistic consumer oriented mass

152. As happened throughout Russian history, the initial pace of the reforms,
initiated from the above'by Yeltsin's team, generated a social upheaval. For examples
of the tremendous pressure applied by the hypertrophic state to -the traditionally
passive and conservative Russian masses, see RAGSDALE, supranote 16, at 31-32, 4961. The perennial dilemma of Westernization verses a retreat to Slavophile sentiments
emerged on the religious plane as well. The proponents of international human rights
standards and the writers of the 1993 Constitution represented the former influence,
while the latter were represented by militant nationalistic and religious groups. See,
e.g., Nielsen, supranote 92, at 10-12.
Furthermore, the break-up of the Soviet Union was a significant event for the
Russian Orthodox Church because the Moscow Patriarchate faced the loss of control
over its branches in the newly-independent states. In response, the Church allied itself
with Slavophiles in order to consolidate its influence. For a review of the status of the
Moscow Patriarchate in the newly-independent states and an analysis of the political
leanings of the Church, see John B. Dunlop, The Russian Orthodox Church as an
"EmpireSaving Institution," in THE POLrrIcS OF RELIGION, supra note 12, at 15, 28-37.
The restoration took various forms ranging from paranoia and open hostility espoused
by Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg, see 7he West Wants Chaos, in CHRISTIANIIY
AFTER COMMUNISM, supra note 1, at 107-13 (elaborating on the plot by the Elders of
Zion) to a more moderate position adopted by Patriarch Alexii and other members of
the Orthodox elite. See Berman, supranote 6, at 300-03 (quoting an insider of the
Orthodox establishment on the proposed law of 1993). The insider stated that the
1993 proposed law:
...was a reaction against the premature invasion of Western missionaries. Of
course we do not want to violate international law or our own constitution or
principles of human rights. But we hope that those legal and moral norms can
be adapted to enable us to meet the acute spiritual crisis that now confronts
US.

Berman, supranote 6, at 303.
See also Vladimir Ivanov, Church and Society in Russia Today, in CHRISrIANrTY AFTER
COMMUNISM, supra note 1, at 29, 38 (professor at the Moscow Orthodox Seminary
arguing for a new conceptualization of church-state relations. The essential features in
this new model are institutional separation between church and state and enhanced
However, the author still reviles pure religious
Orthodox education programs.
pluralism and the "new sub-cultures devoid of any intrinsic bond with Russian
religious tradition).
153.
See Philip Walters, CurrentDevelopments in Russia and the Response of the
Orthodox Church, in CHRISTIANInY AFTER COMMUNISM, supra note 1, at 85-86 (detailing
problems of the Russian Orthodox Church and suggesting infra-structural reforms
that would enable the Patriarchate to meet the new challenges). The author refers to
Russians as "gullible cynics" who viewed with "corrosive cynicism the official ideology
with readiness to lend credence to almost anything else." Id. Currently, many
Russians view the mainstream Orthodoxy with such cynicism, causing them to revert
to the most grotesque eschatological cults, such as White Brotherhood. Id. In this
climate, the paternalistic purpose of the 1997 law is self-evident, and very consistent
with the traditional function of laws in Russia to "educate and guide an individual as a
child" and steer him to the "right' choices. For a discussion of paternalism in Russian
jurisprudence, see HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE INTHE U.S.S.R. 6 (1963).
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4
culture imported from the United States and Western Europe"'5
that many viewed as an antithesis to spiritual life.
Given the historic role of the Orthodoxy and its appeal to a
vast majority of Russians, the Orthodox Church expected to be a

bellwether in the religious renewal.

55

However, there were

significant internal and external impediments to fully realizing
this ambition. For example, the Orthodox Church suffered from

the stain of collaboration with the Soviet regime, 156 and from
assertions of independence by regional branches of the Russian
Orthodox Church in the newly-independent states 5 7 and by other
Christian denominations forced under the aegis of the Moscow
Patriarchate by Soviet authorities. Although the Russian religious

See Nielsen, supra note 59, at 6. The scholars pointed out that the
154.
"religious boom" should not be confused with the revival of Russian spirituality. See,
e.g., Walters, supra note 111, at 86; Beverly Nickles, New Religion Law Fraught With
Potentialfor Abuses, 41 CHRISTIANIY TODAY 66, Nov. 17, 1997 avalkable in LEXIS, News
Library, Intl File (citing a sociological study by the Russian Academy of Science in
1996 which concluded that "a perceived religious renaissance . . . never, in fact,
occurred. While as many as four out of five Russians claim affiliation with traditional
religions, only 7 percent of the population attend a service in any church at least once
a month, and only 4 percent pray regularly."). In comparison, forty-two percent of
Americans attend church services on a weekly basis. See Frederick Mark Gedis &
Roger Hendrix, Democracy,Autonomy & Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in
Modem America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1581 &n.10 (1987).
Resembling Eastern mysticism, the purest life-fleeing Orthodox theology has to
compete with both materialistic values preached by MTV and the passion for business.
Thus, the Orthodox spirituality and materialist market values seem to be mutually
exclusive. In this dilemma, a Protestant formula which combines religious pursuits
and materialist rewards is a formidable challenger to Orthodoxy. See Alexander
Zaichenko, Ethics and Economic Activity in Russia, in CHRISTIANITY AFrER COMMUNISM,
supranote 1, at 39, 40, 44-46 (arguing that Protestant beliefs encourage one to remain
a spiritual individual and attain temporal success as well).
See Berman, supra note 6, at 302 (quoting an insider in the Moscow
155.
Patriarchate: "a great many Russians are ignorant of Russian Orthodoxy or indifferent
to it But their roots are Orthodox. It is our task to return them to Orthodoxy.")

156.

During the communist regime, the Orthodox hierarchy was wholly under

the KGB control. Even Alexii lI acted as an informer under the name of Drozdov. See
Seamus Martin, New Russian Religion Law Harms Mimority Churches, IRISH TIMES, Oct.
6, 1997, at 14, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Intl File; see also Nielsen, supranote
92, at 4; Walters, supranote 153, at 87-88. In the 1991, Fr.Yakunin and Ponomarev
began an extensive research of the opened KGB archives: The findings of this study
shocked many Orthodox believers and led to a formation of the Orthodox splinter
groups such as the True Orthodox Church and the Orthodox Free Church (not to be
confused with Free Russian Orthodox Church, a nationalist-monarchist group) which
did not wish to be affiliated with the Patriarchate that compromised itself in such a way
without formally recanting. For a perceptive expose on this theme, see Dmitriy V.
Pospielovsky, The Russian Orthodox Churchin the PostcommunistCIS, in THE POLITIcS OF
RELIGION, supra note 12, at 41, 48-55. These dissident Orthodox movements also
opposed the 1997 law. See Julia Shargorodska, Dissident Orthodox Priests Blast
Religion Bilg Moscow TIMES, Aug. 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Indep.
Press File, no. 1266, at 1.
See generallyDunlop, supranote 152.
157.
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legislation provided for a gratuitous transfer of sequestered
properties back to the Church, the Patriarchate had no
institutional structures for channeling resources into religious
education and proselytizing efforts. 15 8 At the same time, the
Church faced an increased competition from foreign missionaries
who were experienced and possessed considerable resources for
15 9
mass evangelization.
In addition, the easy registration provisions in the 1990s led
to a proliferation of cults that preached violent, socially
destructive doctrines.1 6 0 Many pseudo-religious entities obtained
an official status allowing them to perpetuate spiritual coercion
and outright fraud. 161
B. The Responses to Challenges in 1993
The
different
religious
adopted

criticism of the new religious "anarchy" took many
forms ranging from paranoid xenophobia, espoused by
and secular nationalists, 162 to a more centrist position
by the Moscow Patriarchate and some prominent

158. See, e.g., Walters, supra note 153, at 94-96 (noting underdeveloped
Orthodox religious education and an influx of missionary literature into Russia which
the Patriarchate could not match). The tension between intellectual and nationalistic
elements of the Orthodoxy was violently projected in the murder of the most refined
contemporary Orthodox theologian and pastor of the Russian intelligentsia, Fr. Men' (of
Jewish descent) by the neo-Nazi Orthodox Brotherhood. See Pospielovsky, supranote
156, at 52.
159. The missionary activities were staged on a grand scale, including "Mission
Volga," a religious cruise sponsored by various Protestant denominations. See Nielsen,
supra note 92, at 8-9; Walters, supranote 153, at 97. These missionaries sometimes
showed great insensitivity to the Orthodoxy. See Pospielovsky, supra note 156, at 5556 & n.40 (describing a failed request by missionaries to rent the Red Square during a
solemn night of the Orthodox Easter). Overall, Dr. Dvorkin, the most famous Russian
crusader against 'totalitarian sects.' describes the Orthodox attitudes towards foreign
religions: "7he competition between the Orthodox Church and the sects is unfair-the
forces are uneven from the outset The sects can buy TV time, plus they use dishonest
forms of recruitment" M. Ivanov, supra note 148, at 8 (emphasis added). Other

threats to Orthodoxy are the financial resources of the missionaries and the close
connection between humanitarian assistance and proselytizing.
160. Such dangerous cults include Aum Senrikyo, which was suspected of
organizing the subway gas attacks in Tokyo in 1995. The sect had daily broadcasts on
one of Russia's largest radio stations. Maxim Isayev & Andrei Vaganov, JapanesePolice
Looks for Aum Senrikiyo Chief,NEZAViSIMAYA GAzErA, Mar. 24, 1995, at 1, avaitable in
LEXIS News Library, Russica Info File, at 1.
16 1. For example, Aur Senrikyo fraudulently attracted some of its followers by
claiming that its theology coincided with Orthodoxy. For a description of the neo-Nazi
White Brotherhood inculcating its young followers, and other new Russian doomsday
cults, see Pospielovsky, supra note 156, at 59-61.
162. The sermon by Metropolitan Ioann, in The West Wants Chaos, supra note
152, passim represents this view.
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politicians. 163 The Orthodox Church appealed to the state to
restore religious equilibrium by enabling it to compete with all
other confessions on 'an equal basis'. For the Orthodox Church,
the concept of equality had a special meaning that diverged from
international principles of separation between church and state.
The Church lobbied for effective restraints on foreign missionary
activity in order to mobilize its resources before the "onslaught of
destructive religious pluralism.' 164 According to Patriarch Aleksii
II, considerable economic and social problems prevented people
from freely choosing a religious confession, especially when they
were "bribed" and "pressured" by the outsiders. 165 This position
presupposed that the Orthodoxy was the right religion for every
ethnic Russian, that people were unable to make an informed
decision for themselves, and that the state had a stake in
assisting the Patriarchate's paternalistic efforts in make people
realize their destiny. 16 6 Consistent with this vision, the equality
of confessions meant an endorsement of the Orthodox Church.
Interestingly, the establishment model did not suit the
Patriarchate because it was wary of pervasive institutional control
16 7
by the state since the late seventeenth century.
In August 1993, the protectionist momentum reached its
apogee when the legislature passed an amended version of the
1990 Freedom of Religion law. Supported by a vast majority of
the deputies, 168 this bill evoked sharp criticism from human
rights advocates and religious minorities because it facially
discriminated against non-traditional religious communities,

especially those with foreign ties. 169 It also contained numerous

163.
Patriarch Alexii excommunicated the White Brotherhood and denounced
radical nationalists. However, Boris Yeltsin still clamored for a law "to protect the

moral and spiritual health of the nation and raise reliable barriers to radical sects
which inflict great damage on the physical and mental health of our citizens." M.
Ivanov, supra note 148, at 8. In his most outspoken statements, the Patriarch also
compared missionary work to the expansion of NATO. See Daniel Williams, FaithCurbing Bil Becomes Law in Russia, WASH. POST, Sept 27, 1997, at A16. The high
Orthodox officials complained that a free can of beer makes an easy conquest of a
Russian to a foreign religion. See id
164. See DeBurght Repor, supranote 6, at 9-10 & n.25.
165. Id.
166. See supra note 153 for a discussion of the traditionally paternalistic quality
of Russian legislation.
167. The Patriarch repeatedy emphasized the importance of institutional
separation between church and state. See, e.g., Interview WrthPatriarchAlexyIT(Official
Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast), Sept 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Intl
News File.
168. On August 27, 1993 the Parliament passed the bill 156-3, with 2
abstentions. See Bourdeaux, supranote 12, at 123.
169. See De Burght Report, supranote 6 at 30-38 (noting the special restrictions
and closer state control of non-traditional religions and foreign religious groups). For
example, article 21 bluntly outlawed foreign missionary activity. See iL at 32.
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provisions allowing for increased state interference in religious
affairs through a registration mechanism. 170 The bill introduced
multiple disproportionate limitations on the freedom to exercise
one's beliefs. 17 1 President Yeltsin voiced his concern with the
spiritual renewal of Russia and the importance of traditional
religious confessions but refused to sign the bill because it
contradicted international legal agreements and compromised the
"equal right of individuals to enjoy freedom of conscience and
religion

.

.

.

regardless

of

their

possession

of Russian

citizenship." 172
The direction of religious policies remained uncertain for the
four years following the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet by
President Yeltsin in September 1993.173
Seemingly, Russia
embraced an enlightened position consistent with the most liberal
strand of international principles on religious human rights and
enshrined these ideals in the Russian Constitution adopted in
December 1993. On the other hand, the new Parliament was
even more ideologically polarized' 7 4 than the previous one, and
therefore, the status of religious pluralism in Russia remained in
jeopardy.
C. Resuming the Religious PoliciesReform in 1997

The concerns that led to proposing protectionist religious
legislation in 1993 resurged in the new draft of the "Law on

170. See id at 35-38. The legislation allowed for arbitrary delays in processing
registration applications for up to one year, and it authorized the agency to refuse
registration on the vague ground of finding a certain belief to be a non-religion. Overall,
specialists concluded that the restrictions on religious organizations were too
burdensome and fell short of international and constitutional standards.
171. See id. at 25-47. Scholars concluded that blanket restrictions on activities
of religious groups and a virtual Orthodox monopoly in such critical spheres as
publication of religious literature and providing religious education were unjustifiable
and inconsistent with religious liberty.
172. Id. at 10.
173. The dismissal of the legislature and the judiciary coincided with an attempt
to pass new religious legislation. For a comprehensive discussion on the struggle
between the branches in that period, see John P. Willerton & Aleksei A. Shulus,
Constructing a New PoliticalProcess: The Hegemonic Presidency and the Legislature, 28
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 787 (1995); Herbert Hausmaninger, Towards a New Russian
Constitutional Court4 28 CORNELL IfNT L.J. 349, 361-65 (discussing the role of the
Constitutional Court in the interbranch straggle and concluding that the Court headed
by Chief Justice V. Zorkin (1991-1993) damaged its legitimacy by becoming involved in
politics and supporting the outgoing Parliament).
174. Wllerton & Shulus, supranote 173, at 796, 823 tbl. 1 (in 1994 elections
communists and socialists claimed twenty-three percent of the seats in the State
Duma, extremists/nationalists and radical reformers each accounted for twenty
percent.
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Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" in 1997.175
Both houses of the Russian Parliament enthusiastically supported
and passed the new version of the law. 17 6 This enthusiasm was
in spite of the experts' warnings that the law violated essential
constitutional provisions and international obligations in the area
of religious rights, especially in connection with the principle of
equality of religious associations. Observers pointed out that the
law was superfluous because the existing criminal legislation
adequately safeguarded society from destructive activities of
pseudo-religious groups and random acts of violence perpetrated
by individual fanatics.' 77 They criticized the new law for allowing
the state to prejudge religious associations, and to place
institutional and ad hoc bureaucratic restraints on the activity of
non-traditional religious communities. 17 8 The thrust of the law
exhibited blatant favoritism of the Orthodox Church. It reinforced

the impression that religious protectionism rather than
permissible concerns such as public safety, health, constitutional
order, or rights of other people, was the primary motivation for
restricting religious liberty.' 7 9
Under persistent international pressure,180 President Yeltsin

vetoed the bill, referring to it as unconstitutional and inconsistent
with Russian international obligations.' 8 ' However, he promised
175.
For a perceptive overview of the traditionalist position by a liberal
journalist, see Andrei Zolotov, Jr., Why Russia Restricts Religions, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Oct 28, 1997, at 18, available in LEXIS, News Library, International File
(stressing inter-denominational jealousy and alienation as well as the traditional theory
on the role of Orthodoxy in Russia, and introducing the concept of "level[ing the
playing field in the race for Russian souls" as the impetus for the new Russian model of
church-state relations "which will be part of the modem world, but not quite American
or European").
176.
For the voting record on the bill, see supranote5.
177.
See, e.g., Aislu Unusova, Svoboda Sovesti I Suoboda Veroispovedani Tak li
Neobkhodirn Otdel'njZakon o Religioznykh Organizats akh I Ob'edineniyakh[Freedom
of Conscience and Freedom of Religion: Is There a Real Need for a Separate Law on
Religious Organizations and Associations], NZVISIMAYA GAZETA-RELIOnI, Sept 25,
1997, at 2.
178.
But see Vladimir Fyodorov, No One is Out to Offend Russian Catholics,
ROSSIIKAYA GAzETA, July 23, 1997, at 7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Russ. Press
Digest File; Galina Vasina, Who, Indeed, Has Vetoed the Law on Religion?, PRAVDA, July
26, 1997, at 1, availablein LEXIS, News ibrary, Russ. Press Digest File (conservative
views on the progress and desirability of religious legislation).
179.
For a brief legal analysis of the new law and a comparison with an earlier
parliamentary version, see Alexandr Soldatov, The Law After a Make-Over, Moscow
NEws, Oct. 29, 1997, at 10, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Current Digest of PostSoviet Press File.
180.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Vice-President Al Gore and the
Pope were particularly vocal in denouncing the bill. d.
181.
See, e.g., Ivan Rodin & Maxim Shevchenko, President's Veto Looks Well
Augmented, NEZAviSiMAYA GAZETA, July 25, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Russian Press Digest File.
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to sign the bill if certain objectionable features were removed. 18 2
As the West celebrated a precarious human rights victory, the
presidential staff busied itself with reaching a rapprochement
with the Patriachate18 3 and ensuring token support from other
major religious denominations.18 4 The resulting version of the
law was "music to the Parliament's ears" 185 because it retained
the system of discriminatory treatment of religious groups and
even contained more restrictive provisions than the parliamentary
version.186 Both the Duma and the Federation Council passed
the law with lightning speed and by an overwhelming majority. 18 7

As the world watched with amazement, President Yeltsin signed
the bill into law in September 1997. The brief period of respect
for the international standards of religious human rights, had
eclipsed and a new era began, inspired by traditional Russian
moral theory.

182. See, e.g., Yeltsin Intends to Pass Freedom of Conscience Law, supra note 8,
at 1.
183. Between July and September, Yeltsin had at least one official meeting with
the Patriarch to discuss the future of the law. See Gayaz Alimov & Gennady
Charodeyev, There Wl Be No Rapprochementudth Communists, IZVESTIA, Aug. 5, 1997,
at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Russian Press Digest File (the Patriarch assured
his support for Yeltsin's upcoming version of the law as long as it protected traditional
religions). At the same time, the Presidents' staff worked on the new text of the law,
leaving the majority of the discriminatory provisions intact, as the Patriarch desired for
the "spiritual health of the people . .. and the preservation of [Russia's] inimitable
face." Zolotov, supra note 12, at 1.
184. Representatives of various minority religions were invited to the Presidential
Advisory Council meetings. However, they did not have a real opportunity to express
their ideas. For instance, the staff made Pentecostals and Adventists signify their
approval before they had an actual chance to look at the text of the law. The most
influential minority religions such as Catholics and the mainstream Baptists failed to
mount a forceful opposition during the "bargaining' process. See Lawrence A. Uzzell,
Letter From Moscow, FIRST THMNGS, Jan. 1998, at 17-19 (criticizing Catholics for "caving
in" to Yeltsin's assurances).
185. See, e.g., Rodin, supranote 127, at 1. The sponsor of the bill in the Duma
admitted that the President's version of the law is even better than the parliamentary
one because it requires all organizations to re-register and places the organizations
that do not meet the 15-year presence requirement on a mandatory probation period,
even if they had already operated as religious organizations under the old registration
system. See infrasection IVD(4)(viii).
186. See id. In addition to mandatory re-registration and the creation of a new
category of religious organizations with diminished rights, the enacted version of the
law also expanded the list of grounds for disbanding religious organizations. See
Soldatov, supranote 179, at 10.
187. For the record of enactment, see supranote 5.
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D. The Structure and SubstantiveHighlights of the New Law
The following discussion tracks the provisions of the new law
and identifies potential problems in its application as well as
inconsistencies with pertinent constitutional and international
law provisions.' 8 8 Subsequent legal challenges to the structure
and enforcement of the new law will likely evoke these concerns.
1. The Preamble
As the most ideological portion of the new law, the preamble
proved highly controversial from the beginning.
The public
debate was understandable, because in a country lacking the rule
of law tradition, the spirit of a law, usually expressed in its

preamble, determines its interpretation and application.
The current preamble has four major elements: 1) confirms
the right of each individual's freedom of conscience and freedom
to profess a religion (veroispovedanie),'8 9 and assures personal
equality before the law regardless of one's convictions; 2)
proclaims Russia a secular state; 3) ranks religions in terms of
their historical significance, and 4) aspires to promote mutual
tolerance of and respect for religious rights. The first, second,
and fourth of these objectives are laudable and consistent with
the international principles of religious human rights. A concern,
however, is that such aspirations are only diluted versions of a
corresponding portion of the 1990 law that explicitly proclaimed
freedom of conscience and religion as an inalienable right of each
individual guaranteed by the Constitution and by Russian
0
international obligations.19
The most controversial part of the preamble is the ranking of
the confessions in terms of their importance to Russian national
identity. Consonant with the traditional moral theory, the earliest
draft of the law placed Russian Orthodoxy at the top of the
hierarchical ladder of religions. 19 1 Within a month, other major

188. For a more detailed exploration of the law and the accompanying
Regulations and Commentaries, see W. Cole Durham, Jr. &Lauren B. Homer, Russia's
1997Law on Freedomof Conscience and Religious Associations:An Analytical Appraisal,
12 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 101 (1998).

189.

Vera literally means "faith" or "creed" and veroispovedanie," professing a

faith," although it is commonly translated as 'religion."

Berman suggested that

freedom of veroispovedaniiconnotes greater rights than freedom of conscience (sovesti
because the former implies the liberty to manifest one's beliefs, as opposed to merely

possess them. SeeBerman, supranote 6, at 295 & n.ll.
190.

See discussion supranote 6.

191. For a discussion of the earliest passed version of the 1997 law, see Moroz,
supra note 77, at 3 (also explores the irony of conservative Russian notion of equality:
"Here everything is vice versa--equality of religions, proclaimed in Constitution, led to
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traditional religions, such as Islam, 192 Judaism, and Buddhism
found their way into the preamble. Originally, Catholicism and
Protestantism did not make it on the list, and the international
communities associated with these denominations exerted great
pressure on Yeltsin to veto the bill. In retrospect, observers
criticized the narrow, superficial focus of these international
lobbying efforts 193 and doubted the propriety of overt political
pressure from abroad. 19 4 The present law accounts for the abovementioned concerns when it adopts the following scheme:
Orthodoxy is recognized for its special role in Russian history and
as the guiding spiritual and cultural force. 195 The law then
announces "respect" for Christianity, 196 Islam, Buddhism and
Judaism as well as other unnamed religions that "make up an
integral part of historical legacy of the peoples of Russia,"19 7 i.e.,

traditional religions.
instability and the proponents of the law seek to restore equilibrium. So if, contrary to
constitutional norms, you would 'slightly suppress' the so-called non-traditional
religions, equality will be restored.").
192. In the earliest version of the law, Islam was placed on the same level with
Russian Orthodoxy. Prior to the break-up of the USSR, there were about forty to fifty
million Muslims, a number comparable with the fifty million members of the Russian
Orthodox Church. See RELIGIOUS POLICY INTHE SOVIET UNION, supra note 61, at 355
app. Islam is the predominant religion in several CIS states, such as Uzbekistan. By
1993, there were 2,639 registered Muslim organizations in Russia, the second largest
number after the Orthodox Church. See Berman, supra note 6, at n.12. However,
Islam lost its highest position as a primary cultural and historic force in the enacted
version of the law.
193.
See, e.g., Uzzell, supranote 184, at 17-19.
194.
See Rodin & Schevchenko, supra note 181, at 1 (noting that Russian
deputies would find it very hard to reform the law because "always in the back of their
minds, they will clearly remember that Yeltsin's veto was motivated by 'pressure from
the outside"). The sponsor of the bill, V. Zorkaltsev, also credited foreign pressure for
helping to enact the law: "I was very concerned that the vote would be close. But this
avalanche of messages from abroad-from the Pope, from Clinton, and the Senate's
action-made our job easy. The moment I heard about all this, I knew that we had
won." (quoted inBowers, supranote 148).
195.
This sweeping affirmation may actually be true in the context of Russian
history discussed in Part II.
196.
Recognition of Christianity as a "respected" confession was actually a major
compromise in the presidential version of the bill. Catholicism, Protestantism,
Orthodoxy not affiliated with the Moscow Patiarchate, and other Christian
denominations are included in this category. Possibly, this recognition will make it
easier for these communities to register and to prove their status as religions. For
example, Zorkaltsev stated that "registration just means putting a rubber stamp on
their status ....
For example, the Baptists, they're Protestants; they're a branch of
Christianity. They dont need to prove that their religion is a proper one." (quoted in
Bowers, supranote 148).
197.
One commentator ironically noticed that this provision makes it easier for

pre-Christian pagans to be the most legitimate Russian religions, see M.Ivanov, supra
note 148, at 7 (quoting suspended Archpriest Ioann Sviridov).
However, this
recognition many be an important one for the tribes in the far regions of Russia, such
as Nenets who still retain their animalist beliefs. For an interesting ethnographic story
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Significantly, the preamble alters the conceptual model of
church-state relations in Russia. Since 1990, a cooperationist
dynamic has existed between the state and various religious
organizations. Although de facto the Orthodox Church received
the greatest portion of state largesse 19 s and archived the greatest
public prominence, 19 9 it was legally on the same level with all
other religions. The new law undermines the former arrangement
by providing a special endorsement of the Orthodoxy. Although

the principle of denominational equality inspires the international
religious rights regime, many other members of the Council of
Europe have a favored religion in either the endorsement or
establishment models. 2 ° ° Therefore, a special recognition of the
Orthodox Church does not appear to contradict international
practice.
The more serious problem is the distinction between
traditional and non-traditional religions which is apparent in the
preamble and which is perpetuated in the substantive provisions
of the new law.
In light of the Russian ideal of Orthodox
supremacy, intolerance, xenophobia, and radical nationalism,
such special recognition of certain religions in the preamble raises
a strong possibility that the endorsement experiment in Russia
will not be benign. 20 1 Thus, the preamble symbolically paves the
way for abuse of the rights of non-traditional religions excluded
from the category of "respected" and for discrimination against
religions appearing lower on the list. Potential gross violations of
the rights of religious minorities and the equality of the
confessions
principle
compromise
Russia's
record
of

on this people, see Fen Montaigne, Nenets: Surviving on the Siberian Tundra, 193 NATL
GEOGRAPHIC 120, 135-37 (Mar. 1998).

198. For example, during the last year the Mayor of Moscow channeled
hundreds of millions of dollars into the reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the
Savior, blasted by Stalin in the 1930s. See Nicldes, supra note 154. The Cathedral
opened with a grand ceremony in September of 1997, coinciding with the enactment of

the new law on religion.
199. Alexii II frequently expressed the Church's opinion on a variety of issues
ranging from the war in Chechnya to presidential elections and even constitutional
questions.

Also, Yeltsin did not hesitate to incorporate high Orthodox officials into

public ceremonies in the Kremlin. See supranote 23.
200. For example, state churches exist in England, Denmark, and Sweden. See
Morozova, supra note 2, at 42-44. Ireland, Italy, and Spain exhibit endorsement
features. Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands fit under the cooperationist model.
France achieved the greatest separation between church and state among European
states. See Durham, supra note 14, at 16-21. These classifications are by no means
absolute. Some countries combine the features of two or more of these models.
201. For a definition of"benign endorsement' and other models, see Durham,
supra note 14, at 20-21. By acknowledging a special role of the Russian Orthodoxy and
by giving traditional religions special rights, infra Part IVD, Russia inaugurated an

endorsement pattern, instead of cooperation and/or accommodation maintained in
1990-97.
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democratization and adherence to international human rights
standards.
2.

General Provisions

The general provisions on the status of the legislation appear
in Chapter I, Articles 1-2. Article 1 defines the broad scope of the
law as regulating norms in the area of human and civil rights,
freedom of conscience and religion, as well as the legal status of
religious associations. The language extending religious rights to
"a human being and a citizen" (pravacheloveka i grazhdanina)is
awkward. The spirit of the failed 1993 amendments suggests that
it is possible that one has to be a Russian citizen to enjoy
religious rights. Such a reading contradicts constitutional20 2 and
basic international principles2 0 3 which imply that all individuals
are entitled to freedom of conscience regardless of their
citizenship. To avoid this undesirable result, the latter qualifier
may be viewed as redundant. Yet, the substantive provisions
which treat citizens and foreigners separately demonstrate that
the choice of language was deliberate.
The legislation regulates not only individual religious rights
but also religious associations. This type of state regulation of
religious entities is common in Europe, even though it sharply
contrasts with the treatment of religious communities in the
United States. 2 °4 Still, whereas in most democratic countries the
registration of a group is a mere formality prior to recognition as a
juristic person, the new law reincarnates the old Soviet legacy of
registration as a formidable tool in the hands of the state to
control the activities of religious communities, and to perpetuate
distinctions and inequalities among them.

202. See KONST. RF., supranote 10, at art. 28 (guarantees religious liberty to
everyone, not just citizens).
203. See Covenant, supranote 100, at art. 18(1); Convention, supranote 101, at
art. 9(1); Declaration, supranote 102, at art. 2(2).
204. See, e.g., Durham and Homer, supra note 188, at 113 (the aim of
registration in the United States is to make flexible entity structures easily available,

whereas the purpose of the Russian law is to effectuate control over such religious

entities). European countries also typically require religious organizations to register.
See De Burght Report, supranote 6, at 35. In United States practice, religions do not
have to be officially recognized. Instead, religious organizations incorporate as nonprofit corporations. The scrutiny for bonafide religious organizations is performed by
the IRS for tax treatment only. Russia was ideally situated to copy the U.S. experiment

because the Russian Civil Code, Chapter I Article 117 specifically deals with public
non-profit and religious organizations. See Unusova, supra note 177, at 2. Russia,
instead, chose a more controlling approach by enacting separate laws regulating

religion. Thus, Russian regulation of religious organizations is reminiscent of the
public corporation regime in the U.S. where the Securities and Exchange Commission
can enforce laws and actively monitor various corporate activities.
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Article 2(1) identifies the Constitution, the Civil Code, the
present law, and normative acts issued in accordance with them,
as the core of federal religious legislation that preempts any local
laws. 205 Unlike the Constitution (Articles 15(4), 17(1) and (18))
and the 1990 law, which explicitly identified international norms
as the highest law in the area of human rights), the new law
incorporates international standards only indirectly. Article 2(3)
states that "nothing [in the law] should be interpreted as a
diminution or limitation of human and civil rights to freedom of
conscience and religion guaranteed by the Constitution . . . or
derived from (vytekayusih) the international treaties."
Thus,

international treaties are no longer an independent source of selfexecuting legal norms. Instead, they have only an indirect effect
as a method to assess Russian religious policies and make sure
that interpretation and application does not fall short of
international standards.
3. Personal Freedom of Conscience and Religion
In contrast to the 1990 law, half of which was devoted to
individual religious liberties, the new law disposes of this task in
a single article that defines individual religious liberty as "the
right to profess individually or collectively any religion or not to
profess any religion, and freely to choose, change, possess and
disseminate religious and other convictions, and act in
accordance with them."20 6 Although this language tracks Article
28 of the Constitution, it neither lists the specifics 20 7 of the right,
nor ties it to the general freedom of thought and expression
provisions. This is a fatal omission because the two freedoms
complement each other, and both are necessary to provide for the
solid protection of religious liberties.
The law explicitly grants the same personal religious liberties
208
to foreign citizens and stateless persons as to Russian citizens.
However, the provision assumes an ominous tone when it
connects the rights to liabilities for violating the present law.
Thus, the law confers jurisdiction over foreign persons for all

205.

This is actually a sensible provision because many local laws on religion,

enacted since 1990, are even more reactionary than the present legislation. For an
excellent overview of such local laws in various regions, see Lauren Homer and
Lawrence Uzzell, Federal and ProvincialReligious Freedom Laws in Russia: A Struggle
For andAgainst Federalismand the Rule of Law, 12 EMORY INTL L. Rav. 247 (1998). See
also Unusova, supra note 177, at 2.
206. THE NEW LAW, supranote 4, at art 3(l). See generallyArticle 3 (determining
the right to freedom of conscience and religion).
207. Comparewith 1990 RUSSLAN LAW, supra note 6, at arts. 3-6.
208. See THE NEW LAW, supranote 4, atart. 3(1).
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violations pertaining to individual religious freedom and activities
of religious associations. For instance, if a court finds that a
foreign missionary "induces a minor to join a religious
association,"20 9 the missionary will be prosecuted under Article
3(5) of the law.
Article 3(2) allows the State to limit freedom of conscience by
federal laws, but only to the extent necessary to protect
constitutional order, morality, health, rights of third persons, and
state security. 2 10 The permissible bases of limitations parallel
those in the Constitution (Article 55) and generally follow the
accepted norms of international law, with one important
distinction. In the international regime, a state can limit only the
exercise of religion and not one's personal beliefs. 2 1 ' In Russia,
the language of the statute permits the State to restrict personal
beliefs as well as their manifestation. 212 Practically, the former
limitation is almost impossible to administer because a person
does not have to identify his religious beliefs.2 1 3 Nonetheless,
such textual sloppiness is disturbing, given Russia's record of
personal repression and its aim to be governed by the letter of
the law.
Finally, Article 3 contains several protective provisions. For
example, Article 3(3) prohibits the establishment of advantages,
limitations, or other types of discrimination depending on one's
attitude toward religion.2 1 4 Article 3(4) confir-ms equality of all
citizens21 s before the law in all spheres of life regardless of one's
religion.2 1 6 Article 3(6) prohibits intentional insults to personal
religious feelings, including the propaganda of religious

209. See id. at art 3(5). The law does not define which actions constitute
inducement, "vovlechenie." The officials applying the law will have to determine it on
an ad hoc basis. This provision may become one of the numerous avenues for
administrative arbitrariness.

210.

Seeid.atart.3(2).

211.

See supranotes 104-05.

212. The provision reads "the right... to freedom of conscience and freedom to
profess a faith may be limited." See THE NEW LAW, supra note 4, at art 3(2).
213. See THE NEW LAW, supra note 4, at art. 3(5). See also Durham & Homer,
supra note 188, at 137.
214.

SeeTHENEW LAW, supranote4, at art. 3(3).

215. When analyzing the law, it is imperative to keep track of the classes of
people to whom the rights are granted. Although the Preamble and Article 3(2-3) grant
equal rights to all, the substantive provisions depart from this general principle. For
example, civil and social rights in Article 3(4) are reserved only for citizens. Moreover,
congregates of organizations with diminished rights, ifi Part 1VD(4)(viii), do not enjoy
the liberties of this provision. The most practical consequence of this distinction is that
members of non-traditional religious communities will not get exemption from military
service in accordance with their beliefs. This inequality can be the basis of a strong
constitutional challenge.
216.

THE NEW LAW, supranote 4, at art 3(4).
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supremacy, threats to destroy personal property, and other acts

2 17
that prevent one from realizing personal religious rights.

Article 3(7) guarantees the secrecy of confession. 2 18

All these

provisions are specific responses to abuses of religious liberty in
the pre-Revolutionary and Soviet times. 2 19 The effectiveness of
these legal norms depends on their ability to influence the culture
of civil society and to neutralize deep-rooted intolerance and
violence.
4. The Status of Religious Associations
The new legislation creates an intricate hierarchy of religious
associations. Such differentiation between religious communities
as well as excessively burdensome registration requirements and
procedures are the most controversial parts of the law and will
constitute the gravamen of any constitutional challenge to it.
i. Separation Between Church and State in a Cooperationist
Mode
Article 4(1) confirms the principles of separation between
church and state, the non-establishment of religion, and equality
of religious associations. 2 20 However, the entire structure of the
22 1
law consistently undermines equality of religious associations.
Article 4(2) explicitly incorporates constitutional principles, and
further defines the meaning of separation. However, the provision
2 22
is silent about equality.
Article 4(3) envisions a cooperationist relationship in which

the state provides religious organizations with a preferential tax
treatment as well as special funding for restoration and
maintenance of cultural objects, and even for secular subjects
taught at religious schools. 22 3 It treats religious employees as

state employees for retirement purposes,2 24 and encourages
public educational institutions to form agreements with religious
organizations to teach religious subjects after regular school
hours. 2 2 5 Also, religious organizations may request that the State

217.
218.

Id. at art. 3(6).
Id. at ar 3(7).

219.

See supraPart 11A.

220.
221.

SeeTHE NEv LAW, supranote 4, at art. 4(1).
See infra Part IVD(4)(iii-viii), passim.

222. SeeTHE NEW LAW, supranote4, at art. 4(1).
223. See id. at art. 4(3).
224. See id at art. 24(4).
225. See id at art. 5(4). This provision presents a sharp contrast to judicial
interpretation of the First Amendment in the United States.
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observe religious holidays as non-working days. 2 2 6 Still, Article
4(4) prohibits public religious rituals and ceremonies during the
exercise of State functions.2 27
A strict enforcement of this
provision is unlikely because many prominent politicians
continue to use their affiliation with the Orthodox Church as a
public relations tool. 228 The same is true for the provision that
religious associations may not participate in the functioning of
state bodies and political parties. 2 29 In practice, the prohibition
may target only minority religions, and is unlikely to reduce the
great influence of the Orthodox Church over the political process.
ii. Religious Associations
Article 6(1) defines religious associations as voluntary
associations of citizens or lawful aliens formed for the purposes of
jointly professing and disseminating a faith (vera2 30 and
exhibiting any of the following traits: a creed (veroispovedanie),
worshipping or engaging in other religious rituals and ceremonies,
or conducting religious instruction of its followers. All religious
associations are subdivided into religious organizations and
religious groups.2 3 1 This is a crucial classification because
groups' rights are a fraction of those enjoyed by some
organizations.
Article 6(4) typifies numerous instances of vague restrictions
on the activities of religious communities. The provision tersely
forbids the creation of a religious association if "its purposes or
actions contravene the law. " 23 2 This language invites an improper
intrusiveness by the state throughout the process of formation
and functioning of religious associations. It presupposes that
local authorities have wide discretion to investigate and assess
the purposes and activities of religious associations. Importantly,

226.
See icL at art. 4(7).
227.
See id at art 4(7).
228.
See supra note 1999; M. Ivanov, Auditing the Sou4 supranote 148, at 8
(picture of Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow standing next to the Patriarch and crossing
himself); Oleg Mramornov, Otnyne Gosudarstvo Uvazhaet Vse IstoridhesiSiozhivshiesia
Verouchenia, No Odno Iz Nikh Priznaet Osobo [From Now On the State Respects All
Traditional Religions, but Specially Recognizes One of Them], NG-RELIGII (Monthly),

Sept. 1997, at 1 (discussing how Yeltsin's desire to be on good terms with the
Patriarchate prompted him to ignore constitutional concerns).
229.

See THE NEw Ltw, supranote 4, atart. 4(5).

230. Neither faith (vera)nor professing a faith (veroispovedanie)is defined in the
law. It is unclear who is responsible for making such determinations and how they are
to be made. This is likely to become an arena for administrative "creativity" and abuse.
SeeinfraPartV. See THE NEw IAW, supranote 4, at art. 6(1).
231. Id at art 6(2). Religious associations in Russia can operate in the form of
either groups or organizations.
232. Id. at art. 6(4).
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in the international religious rights context, a religious
community is presumed innocent until proven guilty.23 3 The new
Russian law reverses this presumption when it targets aspirations
of religious associations as a starting point for official scrutiny. In
this scenario, administrative abuse is practically inevitable.
iii. Religious Groups
Members of religious communities in Russia may opt to
become a religious group if they wish to avoid the complicated
registration process. 23 4 However, a religious group does not
receive the status of a juristic person. 23 5 Article 7(3) limits the
rights of religious groups to conducting worship sessions and
other religious rites and ceremonies, and to teach religion- to its
followers. 2 - However, the groups do not have to file reports with
the state, unless they anticipate transforming themselves into
religious organizations.2 3 7
The state may still monitor the
creation and activities of groups under Article 6(4) because they
23 8
are a form of religious association.
The religious group classification is an extraordinary and,
most likely, unconstitutional legal creature. The circumscribed
rights of groups fall infinitely short of the international liberties of
religious communities. 23 9 The status of groups is similar to that
of religious institutions in the Soviet period when religion was
tolerated as long as it was kept within the "four walls" of a stateowned building. The experts on religious human rights point out
that a legal entity status for religious communities is a
prerequisite to genuine freedom of conscience. 2 4°
Russian
drafters may argue that the law does not force religious
associations to organize themselves as groups, and that juristic
personality is available to communities which elect to become
religious organizations. In practice, some associations will be

233.
See De Burght Report, supranote 6, at 23 (discussing Principle 16(C) of the
Vienna Concluding Document).

234.
235.

See THE NEW LAW, supranote 4, at art. 7(1).
In practical terms this means that religious groups do not enjoy corporate

rights enumerated in Chapter III (Articles 15-24). For instance, religious groups cannot
own property. Prayer facilities and other religious objects are to be provided by

individual members. See id at art. 7(1).
236.
237.
238.

239.

See THE NEW LAW, supranote4, at art. 7(3).
See id. at art. 7(2).
Seeid.atart.6(4).

Compare Article 79(3) of the law conferring solely the rights to worship,

conduct religious ceremonies, and educate its followers with the list of principles in the
Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 103, Principles 16-7.
240.
See De BurghtReport,supranote 6, at 24 (commenting on Principle 16(C) of
the Vienna Concluding Document).
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forced to operate as groups 2 4 1 upon their failure to pass the
rigorous registration requirements
A comparison of the rights of groups versus organizations
highlights an egregious inequality between these two forms.
Granting extensive rights to organizations, derived from their
status as legal entities, and only minimal rights to groups,
contravenes Article 14(2) of the Russian Constitution which
provides for equality of religious associations before the law.2 42 It
is also internally inconsistent with Article 4(1) of the instant
legislation which tracks the constitutional equality language. 24
Finally, the group/organization dichotomy discriminates against
non-citizens because only citizens can form religious groups. 2 4 4
The only justification for this unconstitutional 245 distinction is

the immediate threat of foreign cults that may choose to operate
as religious groups and thereby prevent the state from effectively
regulating their activities. Still, the problem of whether the scope
of the discrimination is proportionate to the danger of foreign
cults remains especially because these foreign cults co-exist with
radical domestic cults. In short, this provision appears to be
another instance of Russian xenophobia.
iv. Definition and Types of Religious Organizations
A religious organization is a type of religious association
formed by citizens or lawful aliens that gets recognition as a
juristic person.2 4
Depending upon the geographical reach of
activities, all organizations are subdivided into either local or
centralized ones. 2 4 7 A local organization must consist of at least
ten members over the age of eighteen who reside in the same
locality.2 48 If at least three local organizations unite under the
same charter, they can apply for recognition as a centralized
religious organization. 24 9 A centralized religious organization can
generate accessory religious organizations under its charter. 25 0

241.
Even this form many not be available to communities that are deemed
subject to liquidation under Article 14(2). These grounds are extended into groups'
context by Article 14(5). The rationales for disbanding religious organizations may also
serve as reasons for banning religious groups. See THE NEW LAw, supranote 4, at arts.

14(2), 14(5).
242. IX at art 14(2).
243. Id. at art. 4(1).
244. See id at art. 7(l).
245. Compareu?&h KONST. RF., supranote 10, at art. 28, 19(2).
246.

SeeTHE NEW LAW, supranote4, at art. 8(1).

247.
248.
249.
250.

See £d at art. 8(2).
See id. at art. 8(3).
See id. at art. 8(4).
See id. at art 8(6).
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The newly-formed accessory organizations can perform a variety
of tasks connected to the functioning of the primary centralized
25 1
organization.
Articles 8(5) and 8(8) are symbolically noteworthy for their
treatment of the naming religious organizations. 25 2 In response
to an alleged proselytizing fraud, organizations must now use
their full name while engaging in activities. 25 3 The word "Russia"
and all its derivative forms can be used only by a narrow class of
traditional religions that have legally operated in Russian territory
for at least fifty years prior to current registration. 2 S 4 This
provision is an excellent example of the protectionist spirit of the
law that is directed against foreign religions and against some
non-conformist groups within the major Russian confessions that
were outlawed by the Soviet government. 25 5 The application of
this provision creates an inconvenience by requiring evidence 2 of
56
the status of a given confession throughout Russian history.

Although the naming classification does not have any tangible
consequences, except for an ability to set up offices of foreign
religious representatives

2
under its auspices,

57

it

is

a

potent

psychological tool for alienating believers who do not belong to
"Russian" churches.

In Russia, where religion,

ethnicity,

patriotism, and social standing are interlinked, this provision is of
great concern. Thus, the potential effects of Article 8(5) can raise
constitutional challenges under Articles 14 and 19(2).258

251.
See id. at art. 8(6). These subsidiary organizations can be additional places
for worship or religious education institutions. They can also perform solely
administrative tasks ("governing and coordinating"). See id. Such organizations can
also engage in charitable or cultural work.
252.
See id at art. 8(5), 8(8).
253. Id. at art. 8 (8).
254.
See id. at art. 8(5).
See supra note 48 (providing examples of such denominations within the
255.
Protestant movement). Also the leaders of the splinter Orthodox communities-such
as Fr. Yakunin of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Fr. Sergeyev of the
True Orthodox Church and Fr. Ardov of the Orthodox Free Church-strongly objected
to the legislation. They argued that the law would give the Patriarchate an upper hand
in expropriating these Orthodox sects and controlling them. They decried this
consolidation measure as inconsistent with the religious pluralism envisioned in the
Constitution. See Shargorodska, Dissident Orthodox Priests Blast Religion Bzl supra
note 156, at 1. Their fears came true upon the enactment of the law. See infra note
347.
256. It is unclear whether a confession's existence before the Revolution will be
taken into account In any case, most religions in czarist Russia were not legally
recognized until 1905. See supraPart IIA(2).
v
supranote 4, at art. 13(5).
See THEN WLAW,
257.
258.
See supra Part IIID(2). Article 19(2) guarantees equality of civil rights
regardless of race, sex or religious belief. Id. at art. 19(2).
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v. The Registration Process
The registration process and its effects on religious
organizations is one of the most problematic parts of the instant
legislation. In particular, excessive complexities throughout the
registration process, the omnipotence of the registration agencies,
pervasive state supervision and control of subsequent activities by
religious entities, and an operational distinction between the full
and limited-power religious organizations, are the most troubling
features of the law.
The hypothetical situations described below are designed to
illustrate the application of the law.
First, the Patriarchate
desires to establish an Orthodox seminary in Tver. Second, a
Hare Krishna community tries to register as a centralized
religious organization in Tver. It submits applications along with
two other sister-communities in Moscow and Yakutsk. Third,
several Mormon families, some from the United States and some
Russian citizens, would like to re-register their existing local
organization in Moscow as required by the new law.
All believe that they qualify as religious associations under

Article 6(1). They also prefer the status of an organization to that
of a religious group because of the severe restrictions on the latter
type of associations. Thus, they need to re-register in order to
become organizations and to acquire their legal entity status.
What do they do next?
First, each must prepare a charter.2 5 9 Article 10(2) lists the
information that should be included in the charter.2 60 In addition
to basic requirements such as the name and location of an
association, the charter must also elaborate its purposes,
prospective activities, structure, and sources of income. 2 6 1 It
must contain a procedure for amending the charter and meet
several other requirements in order to allow the registration
agencies to monitor its activities and to intrude if an organization
departs from its charter. 2 62 In fact, Article 25 (1-2) explicitly
authorizes the registration agencies and the procurator to
supervise organizations' compliance with their charters on a
continuous basis. 2 6 3 The extensive scope of such supervision
may violate separation between church and state. Furthermore,
the law is adamant about registering any amendments to
charters 2 4 and updating information included in the register of

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

SeeTHENEW LAW, supranote4,at art. 10(1)
See f& at art. 10(2).
Seekid
See i
See id at art. 25(1-2).
SeeTmENEW LAw, supranote4, at art. 11(11).
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juristic persons within one month of discovery. 2 6 S Systematic
activities that contravene the purposes with which an
organization was created may lead to disbanding pursuant to a
2 66
complaint by the registration agency.
The next step will differ for each of the three associations.
The Orthodox seminary will swiftly register as a member of the
largest centralized registered organization, the Russian Orthodox
Church. In theory, the seminary will have a choice of registering
as a more independent local organization or remaining a part of
the centralized organization that endows it.
In the former
scenario, it will have to file a petition with a local registration
agency established under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice
in the federal constituent area (sub'ekt) where it plans to
operate.2 67 The application must contain a confirmation note
from the centralized "parent" stating that the seminary was
268
Most
indeed within its structure prior to the application.
likely, the seminary will choose to remain within the structure of
the centralized organization that creates it. The seminary will
then submit its petition, charter, and other documentation 2 69 to
the federal registration agency.
The agency will issue its
2 70
registration decision within one month.
The Hare Krishna's situation will be much different. Despite

its presence in the USSR since the 1970s, it was outlawed by the
Soviet regime.2 7 1 As a result, it never received official registration
prior to 1990. In order to form a centralized organization, the

265.
266.

Seeid.atart 11(12).
Seeid. atart. 14(1).

267.
Article 11(1-3) regulates the process of administering registration in the
Russian federalist structure. The registration agencies may be set up under the
auspices of either federal or constituent Justice Ministries. Id at art. 11(1). Religious
organizations which operate only in one constituent area file with the local registration
agency. I& at art. 11(2). If centralized organizations have branches in two or more
constituent areas, federal registration organs handle their application. Id at art. 11(3).
Presumably, both federal and local agencies must apply federal law, especially if local
law contradicts federal legislation. Id at art. 2(2). However, when discussing
application of the law, one has to be cognizant of differences that may be perpetrated
not only in various Russian regions, but also at different administrative levels.
268.
See THE NEW LAW, supra note 4, at art. 9(1). The certificate must confirm
that an organization was within the structure of the centralized organization of the
same denomination. This is an alternative to presenting an infamous certificate of the
fifteen-year existence, issued by local government See infrapassim.
269.
For the types of information to be included in the application. See generally
THE NEW LAW, supra note 4, at arts. 10(2), 11(5-7). For example, a local organization
must provide a list of its members, and a centralized one, a list of its founders. Also,
local organizations must submit information about basic religious beliefs and history,
as well as views on education, civic duties, marriage, and health. See id at art. 11(5).
This requirement will allow agencies to screen out 'dangerous' cults.
270.
Seeid atart.1(8).
271.
See Antic, supranote 61, at 260-65.
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associations in Moscow, Yakuts, and Tver will have to present the
federal registration agency with three charters confrming their
status as local religious organizations.
This facially benign
requirement is the most formidable obstacle to non-traditional
religions.
Under the 1997 law, all religious entities recognized under
the 1990 law will have to re-register. Article 27(4) mandates reregistration for all organizations by December 31, 1999, under the
penalty of liquidation by a judicial order.2 7 2
The Krishna
associations in Moscow, Yakuts, and Tver will have to obtain new
registration as local organizations, and then submit these three
approved charters for re-registration as a centralized organization.
However, in order to qualify as bona fide local organizations, the
applicants will have to furnish "a document that confirms the
existence of that religious group on the given territory for no less
than fifteen years."273 This is one of the most problematic and
ambiguous provisions in the law. It is unclear how and from
whom a religious association can get such document. Although
the language does not require a local group to have fifteen years
of prior legal existence as a registered religious entity,2 74 it is
practically impossible to imagine how anything other than a
certificate of such official existence will suffice. For Hare Krishna
this requirement is particularly burdensome because fifteen years

ago the USSR simply refused to recognize its existence. Will the
Soviet press materials of the early 1980s ridiculing Hare Krishnas
be accepted as a proof of actual existence? Will the imprisonment
of its leaders under Article 227 of the Soviet Penal Codeinfringement upon personal rights under the guise of performing
religious rites-or their confinement to psychiatric institutions be
sufficient to demonstrate their existence? All of these questions
are left to the discretion of the registration agencies. The decision
is in the hands of bureaucrats influenced by a tradition of
intolerance, xenophobia, and scientific atheism.
Acknowledging this high burden of proof, the law creates a
special niche for confessions not registered during the Brezhnev
era. Article 27(3) "graciously" extends the status of a juristic

272.
See THE NEW LAW, supranote4, at 27(4).
273. Id. at art. 11(5). See also Durham and Homer, supranote 188, at 195-207
(noting that no other European country has a similar fifteen year provision as a
prerequisite to acquiring full legal personality).
274. Ruslan Orekhov, Yeltsin's chief legal advisor, emphasized that to be an

"established" faith, an organization must show that it has been active for fifteen years.
That does not mean it must have been registered for fifteen years. The effect of this law
is to target sects outside the mainstream. See Larry Stammer, Russians Reassure US
on Religious Freedom, L.A. MMES, Sept 24, 1997, at 14A, available in LEXIS, News

Library, Intl File.
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person to such organizations, but with substantially diminished
rights and a mandatory re-registration each year until they reach
the fifteen-year "age of maturity."2 75 This is the most flagrant
violation of constitutional and international norms of equality of
religious associations before the law, as it uses the policies of the
Soviet era to arbitrarily differentiate between religious
organizations. This provision also directly conflicts with Article
54 of the Constitution which guarantees that laws establishing or
2 76
heightening responsibility cannot be retroactive.
Depending upon the officials' attitudes, Hare Krishnas may
not even be able to avail themselves of this limited organization
status. Article 27 prohibits registration if an organization exhibits
any traits for which it can be liquidated under Article 14(2).277
For instance, engaging in rituals found detrimental to public
health or morality, or improperly using drugs, psychotrophic
devices, and hypnosis during their ceremonies, are some of the
grounds for liquidation. 2 78 The Hare Krishna group will have to
wait for up to six months while the registration agency conducts a
review (ekspertiza) of its charter and of its general profile and
27 9
practices.
Mormons will encounter many of the same problems as the
Hare Krishnas.
They will have to prove their fifteen-year
existence in Moscow in order to obtain the local legal entity
status. Unlike the Hare Krishna, however, the first Mormons did
not come to Russia until the early 1990s, so they will not
28 0
encounter the same difficulties establishing their existence.
Thus, there will be no imbroglio in establishing its existence.
Mormons will also have to submit to a six-month examination
period throughout which a local registration agency will examine
its charter, the charter of its foreign parent-organization,2 8 1 and
make sure that Mormons are not subject to liquidation under
Article 14(2). The agency will have a great deal of discretion
during the entire process. If it finds that the Mormon church
should be liquidated, the case will automatically go to court where

275.
276.

See THE NEW LAW, supranote 4, at art. 27(3).
KONsT. RF. at art. 54(1). This was one of the most persuasive arguments

against promulgating this law. See infra note 350 (citing the Statement of the Head of
Registration of the Russian Ministry of Justice).
277.

See THE NEw LAW, supranote 4, at art. 27(3) para. 2.

278.

See id. at art. 14(2).

279.

See THE NEv LAW, supra note 4, at arts. 11(5), 11(8).

The Russian

government is authorized to issue a set of procedures to be utilized during such
examination.
280.
See M. Ivanov, Auditing the SouL, supranote 148, at 10-11 (reporting on his
visit to the Mormon Center in Moscow and his conversation with the leader of the
mission, Donald Jarvis).
281.
See THE NEWLAW,supranote 4, atart. 11(6).
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the religious community will appear as a defendant. 28 2 If the
agency re-registers Mormons, they will receive the status of a
religious organization with limited rights. 28 3 They will also be
required to re-register every year until they can prove their
fifteen-year existence in Russia. These clearly disproportionate
limits on freedom of religion, even in light of a perceived danger to
public health or national
security,
clearly contravene
constitutional and international norms.
If the agency denies registration to Mormons and the court
agrees with such a determination, the Mormon church cannot
exist as a religious organization, even as one with limited rights.
It probably cannot operate even as a religious group, due to the
28 4
likelihood of a ban under Article 14(2) and 14(5) of the law.
Mormons may have some special rights under Article 13, which
regulates representative offices of foreign religious organizations.
Article 13(3) leaves the questions of registration and the opening
and closing of such offices to be addressed through
regulations. 28 5 Still, Article 13(2) clarifies that these outposts of
foreign religions are not deemed religious associations by the
law. 28 6 Accordingly, they can not engage in cultic or other
religious activity. 28 7 The function of these offices remains unclear
and presents another example of objectionable differentiation
28 8
between religious rights of Russian citizens and foreigners.
vi. Grounds for Denying Registration
As Soviet history demonstrates, authorities had unlimited
discretion to deny registration to religious communities. The new
law aims to prevent such rampant administrative abuse in Article
12(2) and prohibits non-registration due to undesirability
(nezelesoobraznost)of forming a religious organization. 28 9 This
provision also requires that a written explanation for the denial be

282.
See icL at art. 27(3). Presumably, organizations will be able to counterclaim with constitutional challenges, such as general inequality or administrative

abuse. See infra Part V.
283. This is the rate of all confessions failing to satisfy their fifteen year presence
requirement. See THE NEW lAw, supranote 4, at art. 27(4) para. 3, 4.
284. See id at art. 1492) (listing 12 grounds for liquidating religious
organizations); art. 14(5) (permitting the application of the same criteria in the context
of religious groups).
285.
286.

See id. at art. 13(3).
See ii. at art. 13(2) para. 2.

287.

Id

288. For a discussion of the recently promulgated regulations of foreign religious
entities, see Durham & Homer, supranote 188, at 190-95.
289.

See TiE NEw LAw, supranote 4, at art. 12(2).
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given to the applicant.2 90 Most importantly, it gives religious
organizations a right to appeal the denial or the agency's failure to
make a decision within the established time (uklonenie) in
court.2 9 1 This is the only explicit conferral of the right to sue to
2 92
religious organizations in the entire body of the new law.
Article 12 sets out a list of five grounds that agencies may
use to deny registration. 29 3
Three of them focus on the
mechanics of the application. 2 9 4 The two remaining grounds are
more problematic.
Article 12(1) allows an agency to deny
registration if it finds that the submitted charter contravenes
constitutional or other federal norms.2 9 5 The registration officers
296
have broad discretion to scrutinize the charter for such flaws.
However, the agency must then provide specific references to the
allegedly violated constitutional or legislative provisions. 2 9 7 This
thoughtful requirement will help to contain potential abuse and
give applicants a chance to reform their charter or even to submit
a particular issue to court for review. The liberal inclinations of
the law cease at this point.
Most troubling, denials of registration will likely occur due to
non-recognition
of applicants
as religious organizations.
Conspicuously absent from the text of the law is any method to
determine whether an organization qualifies as religious and any
information about the person authorized to make this decision.

What if a liberal minded official in Yakutsk thinks that Hare
Krishna is a religion and one in Tver views it as a totalitarian
non-religious sect? Russia does face a serious problem of sham
religions and dangerous sects, but this problem does not justify
the denial of registration to a legitimate group under the pretext
that it is not a religion. The disproportionality of this protective
measure is even more obvious because the State can protect itself
through the law's liquidation mechanism, which is based on

290. See id.
291.
See id.
292. Other avenues ofjudicial redress may be available through incorporation of
constitutional human rights principles and their direct applicability. See infra Part VA.
293. See THE NEW LAW, supranote4,at art 12(1).
294. Such mechanical grounds occur when another organization with the same
name already exists, the information in the charter is incorrect, or the founders lack
legal rights (usually age and citizenship). Importantly, the agency may summarily
reject an application without reviewing it if the information provided is incomplete.
There are potential problems with this provision as seen in the recent case in the city
of Reuty. See Ivaneko, infra note 347, at 16.
295. THE NEW LAW, supra note 4, at art. 12(1).
296. See id at art. 11(8) (enabling the administrative bodies to conduct up to a
six months discovery, ekspertiz).
297. See id. at art. 12(2).
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actual conduct of religious communities. 29 8 It is unfortunate that
Russia will follow the European practice of prejudging beliefs
rather than the U.S. precedent. This ground for non-registration
can become a potent tool for administrative tyranny and
discrimination against new or minority beliefs.
Article 12 is deceptive in that it seems to imply that the above
mentioned grounds for non-registration are exclusive. A careful
reading, however, suggests that all the liquidation grounds in
Article 14 are applicable by reference. Article 27(3) specifically
prohibits re-registration if the agency "has reasons to believe" that
an organization is subject to liquidation under Article 14(2).299

Article 27 re-registration requirement is extremely important
because it mandates re-registration of all currently registered
religious organizations. 3° In practice, all existing organizations
that intend to continue to operate as such, risk being denied
registration or liquidation by judicial means when they apply for
re-registration.
vii. Grounds for Liquidation
Article 14 contains a long list of grounds for liquidation if an
organization's activities constitute a menace to society. This
article can be activated by the procurator or the registration
agency.3 0 1 It can also be invoked at time the agency determines

that an organization does not comply with its charter, or meets
other grounds for liquidation. 3° 2 Furthermore, local governing
organs (organy mestnogo samoupravlenia)have standing to bring
liquidation and banning actions against religious organizations
and groups.3 0 3 Once disbanded, an organization loses its juristic
personality, and its property is distributed in accordance with its
3 o4
charter.
There are twelve paragraphs in Article 14(2) defining the
305
grounds for banning groups and liquidating organizations.
These
expansive
grounds
invite
active
administrative

298.
See infra Part IVD4(vii).
299.
See THE NEW LAW, supranote 4, at art. 27(3) para. 2.
300.
See id. at art. 27(4).
301.
SeeiUatart. 14(2).
302.
See 0- at art. 14(l) para. 1. See also art. 25(2) (enabling the registration
agencies to monitor an organ to monitor compliance with its charter).
303.
See id at art. 14 (3, 5). Observers often noted how local officers "can stage
a veritable religious slaughter" with the use of such vague provisions. See, e.g.,
Bourdeux, supranote 12, at 119.
304. If an organization's charter does not specify how to proceed in this case,
general civil legislation determines the distribution of property. See THE NEw LAW,

supranote4, at art. 14(4).
305.

See id at art. 14(2).
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enforcement. The State would not have to try very hard to ban or
liquidate an objectionable organization or group under one of
these provisions.
For example, the Church of Scientology is
almost certainly subject to liquidation because it uses
"psychotrophic" devices.
Some Amish-type communities are
definitely illegal because they prevent their children from getting
primary education and they provoke citizens to abstain from
carrying out legally established civic duties. Furthermore, if one
adopts Patriarch Alexii's thesis that any missionary activity is by
definition coercive and detrimental to individual liberty, all
evangelical organizations will be in danger of liquidation as
"inflicting coercion upon an individual or interfering with civil
3 06
rights and liberties."
These numerous reasons for liquidation clearly exceed the
307
narrow bases upon which a state can limit religious liberties.
Even if originally intended as a clarification of broad
constitutional norms,3 0 8 rather than new substantive rules
enabling the state to close down organizations and curtail
religious practices, this departure from the Constitutional text is
unfortunate because it creates additional ambiguities and lays a
deeper foundation for abuse by law enforcing organs.
viii. Distinctions Between the Rights of Organizations as a Result
of Meeting the Fifteen Year Existence Requirement
Once a religious association passes the mandatory reregistration under the new law, it becomes an organization and
acquires broad rights as a juristic person.3 0 9 In contrast to the
Soviet period, during which religious organizations were

306. Id. at art. 14(2), para 6. This scenario is particularly likely if the
Patriarchate has as much influence over application and interpretation of the law as it
had over its enactment
307.
Comparewith KONST. RF., supranote 10, at art. 55(3); Covenant, supranote
100, at art. 18(3); Convention, supranote 101, at art. 9(2).
308.
In contrast to the common law tradition in the United States in which
courts, especially the Supreme Court, define the parameters of the First Amendment
as it pertains to religion, see generally Witte, supranote 15, at 403-3 1, Russia is a civil
law country. Expansive legislation and administrative decrees are the hallmarks of this
system. So, it was natural that laws would elaborate on broad constitutional principles
of religious liberty. However, such broad, careless language in the special statute on
religion is unfortunate and is likely to significantly restrict the freedom of religion
espoused in the Constitution. For a discussion of differences between civil law,
socialist, and common law traditions and their effect on the judiciary's ability to protect
individual rights, see Robert F. Utter and David C. Lundsgaard, ComparativeAspects of
Judicial Review: Issues Facing the New European States, 77 JUDIcATURE 240, 240-44
(1994).
309.
See THE NEW LAW, supra note 4, at chapter III, arts. 15-24 (powers and
obligations of religious organizations).
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powerless, Articles 15-23 of the Law explicitly authorize such
organizations to perform an array of functions. However, even
though all newly-reregistered organizations become juristic
persons, the religious communities which cannot prove their
fifteen-year existence in the given area or fail to present a
certificate from a centralized religious organization of the same

denomination do not enjoy the rights accorded to traditional
churches.3 1 0 Instead, they are placed on a mandatory probation
period during which they have to re-register every year, although
they eventually may be eligible to receive equal treatment.3 1 ' This
dichotomy between organizations with full rights and those with
limited powers blatantly defies constitutional and international
norms.
The prerogatives of organizations with full rights are on par
with international standards.
Article 15 allows religious
organizations to operate according to their own bylaws as long as
they are consistent with their registered charters and do not
contravene federal legislation.3 1 2 Religious organizations are free
to conduct any type of rites on their properties. 313 They also have
3 14
an unrestricted access to cemeteries and pilgrimage sites.
They may conduct services in hospitals, elderly care centers,
orphanages, and even prisons, at the inmates' requests.3 1 5 In
order to conduct public services in other places, they need only to
3 16
go through the same permit process as secular groups.
Article 17 gives religious organizations a right to produce,
purchase, export, import, and disseminate religious literature and
audio-visual materials for religious purposes. 317 Also, religious
organizations have a monopoly on producing prayer books

310. SeeTHE NEIV LAW, supranote 4, at art. 27(3), para. 2 (probation period); art.
27(4) (mandatory re-registration of all organizations legally existing prior to the new
law).
311. Id. According to the final version of the law, organizations on a probation
period will be eligible to receive full rights after presenting a certificate of the fifteenyear existence in that territory. Most likely, the years of existence prior to 1997 will be
taken into account. Thus, the Mormon Church, which has operated since 1991, will
be on a probation period only until 2006, as opposed to 2112 if calculated starting in
1997. This means that Mormons will have to go through nine mandatory yearly reregistrations, with all perils and inconvenience that they entail.
312. See id at art. 15(1). The state "respects such internal bylaws if they are
not at odds with Russian federal legislation. See id. at art. 15(2).
313. See i. at art. 16 (1-2). Property ownership by religious organizations is a
hallmark of post-Soviet legislation on churches.
314. See id. at art. 16(2).
315. Seefid atart. 16(3).
316. See id. at art 16(5). The other rights of religious organizations also could
have been easily taken care of by general civil legislation. See supranote 162.
317. See id at art. 17(1).
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(bogosluzhebnaya literatura)and ritual objects. 3 18 In order to
counteract alleged fraud and manipulation by certain religious
communities, an organization that produces such items must
3 19
mark its full name on the objects.
Article 18 is particularly important because it allows religious
organizations to engage in charitable activities either directly or
through special foundations. 3 20
In order to realize the goals
specified in its charter, an organization may establish religious
schools, cultural centers, and mass media corporations. 32 1 The
government pledges to support charitable religious organizations,
including significant cultural and educational programs.3 2 2 This
last provision gives an advantage to traditional religions,
especially the Orthodox Church, because Russian political culture
views the Orthodox revival as a significant cultural event.
Article 19 redeems the structural weakness of religious
organizations by giving them an exclusive right to set up
institutions for professional religious training. 32 3 Such schools
32 4
receive state licenses upon registration.
Article 20 permits organizations to maintain contacts with
foreign religious communities, and gives them an exclusive right
to invite foreign citizens to engage in professional religious
activities such as preaching. 3 2s This is a significant provision
because now foreign missionaries will have to get invitations from
religious organizations, rather than from individual citizens or
foreign representatives, in order to enter Russia for the purposes
of proselytizing or engaging in other religious activities.
Article 21 restores property rights to religious organizations,
a feature they have been legally deprived of since the age of
Catherine 11.326 Religious organizations can own personal and
real property, including historical monuments, manufacturing
3 27
and charitable establishments, and establish bank accounts.
Importantly, the state transfers back property, nationalized

318.
319.

See id. at art 17(2).
See id. at art 17(2).

320.

See id at art. 18(1).

321.
See id. at art. 18(1-2).
322.
See id. at art 18(3).
323.
See id. at art. 19(1). On the acute need for professional religious teaching,
see supranote 116.
324.
See id. at art. 19(2).
325.
See id at art. 20(2).
326.
See supranote 44.
327.
See id. at art. 21(1). Religious organizations also have a right to own
property earned through their own activities, donated by citizens, transferred by the
state, or acquired in any other legal manner.

222

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:167

during the Soviet regime, free of charge. 3 28
Naturally, the
Orthodox Church will remain the greatest beneficiary of this
some tax and creditor
The law also provides for
policy.
32 9
exemptions to religious organizations.
The gap between organizations with full rights and those on a
First of all, the latter
probation period is enormous.330
congregates are explicitly denied civil equality before the law,
which amounts to a gross deviation from Article 14.33 1 They
cannot create private religious education institutions or arrange
for religious education of children on public school premises in
Aside from violating constitutional and
the after-hours. 3 32
international norms, this reservation gives traditional religions a
tremendous advantage in one of the most crucial areas in which
This provision forces theological
they sought control.3 3 3
instruction by non-traditional religions back underground.
The organizations with limited rights cannot set up
representative offices of foreign religious organizations.33 4 They
also cannot invite foreign citizens to act as priests and in other
professional religious capacities.3 3s This is a significant limitation
because many new religions in Russia have extensive foreign
contacts.
The public profile of new religions will also be diminished.
For example, they will not be allowed to conduct services in public

328. See id at art. 21(3). Restitution is atypical in church-state relations in
post-communist states. The state responds to a moral obligation to expiate for its
former hostility to religion. See Tamis F6ldesi, Religious Human Rights in Eastern
Europe, 10 EMORY INTL L. Rev. 127, 133-36 (1996) (gratuitous transfer of property is a

precondition for free exercise of religion).
329. See id.at art 21(5).
330. See a list of rights denied to organizations that fail to prove their fifteen-year
existence in Article 27(3) paragraph 4. Currently, organizations on a probation period
do not enjoy the rights in Articles 3(4), 5(3-4), 13(5), 16(3), 17(1-2), 18(2) (as relates only
to education and mass media), 19, 20(2).

331.

See supranotes 142-43.

332.

Religious organizations with full rights have such powers. See THE NEV

LAw, supranote 4, at art 5(3-4), 27(3), para. 4.
333.

The Patriarchate claimed anarchy and inequality (i.e., no Orthodox

monopoly) in religious education. Generally, Alexii II complained that foreign religions:
resort to methods of zombiing and hypnosis. They resort to psychotrophic
means. Thereby the personality is suppressed. Capitalizing on our difficulties
they buy the souls of Russian people by handing our free literature and
invitations to travel abroad. They are vigorously infiltrating educational
establishments.
Intenew with PatriarchAlexyl, OFFMCIAL KREMLIN I'nt NEWS BROADCAST, at 1, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File. The Patriarch also said that it cannot compete with

media evangelists because it must allocate financial resources into restoring churches.
334.

See THE NEW Law, supranote 4, at art. 27(3) par. 4.

335.

See id.
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institutions such as hospitals and prisons.336 This rule
compromises both the individual freedom of conscience of people
in such institutions and the principle of proportionality for
restrictions on the manifestation of religion. The arbitrariness of
this limitation is best demonstrated in the context of Pentecostals.
Some Pentecostal communities belonged to the dissident wing of
the Protestant movement (C.C.E.C.B.) and consciously refused to
register with the Soviet authorities. 3 37 These communities will
have the same difficulties proving their fifteen-year existence as
the Hare Krishna described in the earlier hypothetical. They will
be placed on probation only because of their courage in defying
the Soviet regime in the past, whereas the members of the same
religious faith who cooperated with communists will enjoy full
rights as a time-tested organization that does not pose a threat to
society.
The traditional religions will also have a monopoly on
publishing, importing, and distributing religious literature to the
detriment of the limited power organizations.338 The restriction
undermines constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion and
expression. The Orthodox Church clamored for such limitations
because it felt truly threatened by an influx of Protestant
literature.3 3 9 But there was also a legitimate need for some
regulation of the mass media against excessive usage by
destructive cults such as Aum Senrikyo.
As some Russian
observers have suggested, general civil legislation would have
been the best way to achieve such legitimate purposes without

violating constitutional guarantees that are inherent in a flat
denial of rights to some religious organizations based on the
arbitrary length of existence requirement. 3 4°
Allowing new religious communities to conduct charitable
activities was probably the most important concession in the final
version of the bill.3 41 However, to protect traditional faiths from

336.

See id.

337.

See STEEVES, supranote 18, at 144-45.

338.

Rights in Article 17(1-2) are denied to non-traditional religions. This is a

gross violation of the freedom of expression. See generallyDe Burght Report, supranote
6, at 33. The provision imposes broad prohibitions not only on objects used during
worship, but also on all kinds of religious materials in printed or audio-visual form.
For example, the Mormons in the hypothetical above would no longer be able to pass
brochures introducing their beliefs. This policy is consonant with the Patriarch's
demands. See supranote 333.
339. See supranote 158.
340. See supranote 177.
341. The missionaries' resources were always a threat to traditional religions.
The Patriarch complained that the missionaries use humanitarian aid as a lure for
spiritually naive Russians. See supranote 333. However, the foreign denominations
provided much needed humanitarian aid to Russians who felt the stress of adjusting to
a new socio-economic system. See Andrei Zolotov, Duma PassesHarsherReligion BA
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competing with the new ones, usually backed by rich foreign
sponsors, the law still prohibits organizations with limited rights
from establishing cultural and religious education facilities, and
from establishing their own mass media sources.3 4 2 The new
religions are also deprived of the right to create their own
institutions of professional religious training. 34 This provision is
reminiscent of Soviet methods of battling religion. 344 Along with
the prohibition on inviting foreign religious professionals as
preachers,3 4 s this restriction casts a shadow on the prospects of
survival for the new denominations in Russia. Overall, the
restraints on the rights of certain religious organizations interfere
with individual liberty to profess the religion of one's choice, and
contravene basic international religious human rights principles
because they act as barriers to one's equal access to all religions.
V.

PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAW AND THE WAYS
TO CHALLENGE VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND

INTERNATIONAL NORMS ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION

As noted above, the current political and social climate as
well as traditional moral theory and historical inclinations militate

for strict enforcement of the 1997 law despite numerous highlevel assurances 3 46 to the contrary.

Recently reported incidents

Moscow NEws, June 24, 1997, at 1, availabein LEXIS, News Library, Indep. Press File,
no. 1234. For example, the missionaries cared for the homeless and the greatly

impoverished elderly, new phenomena in post-Soviet society. For a commentary on
the June version of the law deploring the prohibition to engage in charity work,
342. Rights contained in Article 18(2) are denied.
343. See THE NEW LAW, supranote 4, at art 37(2) para. 4 (denying professional
training rights in Article 19).
344. See supraPart IIA(3).
345. These are the prerogatives under Article 20(2). Now, religious organizations
,with full rights have a monopoly on inviting clerics to engage in professional conduct
Private individuals may still invite religious professionals as long as they abstain from
religious activities. Id.
346. For example, the White House had assurances "from the highest level of
the Russian government that Russia will continue to respect the rights of religious
minorities and to honor its international commitments to religious freedom." See
Yeltsin Signs Controversia Religion Law, supranote 7. Moreover, pursuant to the Smith
Amendment adopted by the US Congress, monetary aid to Russia depends on
"nondiscriminatory implementation" of the law. For a discussion of applicability of this
Amendment, see Durham and Homer, supra note 188, at 237-39. However,
democratic and international legality concerns will have to be balanced against the
interest in enforcing the new law "[to ensure] the rights of majority of believers and [to
protect] society from totalitarian sects." See Stammer, supranote 274, at 14A. Thus,
despite state assurances, Russian leaders will not be able to wholeheartedly honor
them.
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of intolerance, non-registration, and violence in various regions 3 4 7
confirm the worst fears about the effect of the law.
In general, there are two major flaws in the legislation that
are likely to foster undemocratic developments: textual violations
of constitutional/international norms on freedom of religion and
broad powers conferred upon administrative agencies during the
process of re-registration and liquidation. In the short term,
courts can ameliorate these problems. However, a comprehensive
solution must involve changing societal attitudes towards
religious rights.

A. JudicialRecourse
The analysis of the text of the law in the previous sections
revealed numerous conflicts with constitutional and international
norms as well as internal contradictions among various

347. See, e.g., Alexey Maliutin, Noginsk: Svoboda Sovesti Posle 19 Sentiabria
[Noginski Freedom of Conscience After September 19th] Moscow NEws, Oct. 12. 1997
(describing a violent raid and the dosing down of a sectarian Orthodox monastery after
a local court awarded the building which it occupied to the Moscow Patriarchate;
noting that the spirit of the new law endorses such radical treatment of dissident
sects); Phil Reeves, Dispatches: 7he Night Religious PersecutionReturns to Russia, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 15, 1997, at 13, availablein LEXIS News Library, Intl File
(describing the same raid and quoting Dr. Uzzell of the Keston Institute: In Russia
laws are often taken as signals rather than as a precise instruction. This law was a
signal that it is [an] open season when it comes to religious minorities." Fr. Adrian, a
priest of the Free Orthodox Church also predicted: "We are the first victims, there will
be more").
Other disturbing developments were reported from various Russian regions. For
example, in municipal election in the Tumen' region, one candidate alerted the
authorities that his contestant was a Pentecostal and asserted that such religious
affiliation prevented her from running. It also blackened her reputation as a judge.
See Sergey Ivanenko, Svoi Zakn [One's Own Law], Moscow NEWS, Nov. 30, 1997, at
16.
The actual, highly reactionary application of the law occurred in the city of Reuty
(Moscow region). See id The Pentecostal community applied for re-registration and

the agency summarily rejected it because the applicants failed to submit a certificate of
the fifteen-year existence and therefore, their application was incomplete. The law
gives agencies the power to reject the application automatically if it lacks any necessary
documentation. See THE NEW LAW, supra note 4, at art. 11(9). A certificate of the
fifteen-year existence is part of the registration application under Article 11(5). So the
agency had legal authority to act as it did. However, such interpretation of the law
would make annual re-registration under Article 27(3) for organizations on a probation
period absolutely impossible. It prevents the implementation of a scheme designed by
law drafters, one that creates two separate classes of organizations, one with full and
the other with diminished rights. In the Reuty situation, the community can possibly
sue the agency under Article 12(2), for falling to make a substantive decision on
registration. See supraPart IVD(4)(v-viii), passim.
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provisions.3 48 The most conspicuous constitutional problems are
as follows:
1. Differentiation between the rights of religious
organizations based on meeting the fifteen-year existence
requirement, and effective denial of basic religious and
freedom of expression rights as a result of this
distinction.3 49
Also, retroactive imposition of the
heightened registration requirements contradicts Article
54 of the Constitution, as the Head of the Department for
Registration
of
Religious
Associations
has
35 0
acknowledged.
2. Inequality among individual believers manifested
in classifications such as: citizens or foreigners, members
of religious groups or members of religious organizations,
members of religious organizations with full rights3 5 or
members of religious organizations with limited rights. '
3. Severe limits on freedom of religion as defined
in the Constitution accomplished through a complex
registration
process
with
low
administrative
352
accountability.
4. Expanded grounds for liquidation of religious
organizations and groups that undermine democratic prerequisites of compelling justification5 3 and proportionality of
3
any curtailment of religious rights.

5. Erosion of the separation between church and
state through ubiquitous state supervision
over
organizations' compliance with the purposes set out in

348.

For example, Article 3(1) grants equal religious rights to foreign citizens, but

Article 7(1) does not permit them to form religious groups, and representative offices of
foreign religions under Article 13(2) are not religious associations at all and can not

engage in religious activity. See generaUy Soldatov, supranote 179, at 16.
349. See supraPart IVD(4)(viii).
350.

See GA. KRYLOVA, SVOBODA SovEsI NA VESAX PRAVOSUDIJA, 231 (1998)

[Freedom of Conscience on the Scales of Justice] (citing A. Kudriavzev for the

proposition that ifthe Ministry refuses to re-register a formerly registered organization
under the new law, such result would be inconsistent with Article 54 of the Russian
Constitution that provides for non-retroactivity of laws establishing or increasing
responsibility. He also predicted that the Constitutional Court would definitely find
such arrangement unconstitutional if the matter is ever presented to it)
351.
See supraPart IVD, passim.
352. See supraPart IVD(4) (v-vi).
353. See supraPart IVD(vii).

1999]

RELIGIOUS "LIBERTY" I RUSSIA

227

strict reporting requirements regarding
their charters and
3 s4
internal changes.
6. General unjustifiability of numerous categories
and limitations in the law.
In addition to the above mentioned problems, the following major
international principles of religious human rights
deviations from
355
are apparent:
regulation of
1. The same heightened level of
356
individual's personal beliefs and practices.
Automatic discrimination against religious
2.
organizations which can not prove their fifteen-year
existence clashes with a "presumption of innocence" until
of a religious organization rebuts that
the actual conduct
35 7
presumption.
There are several opportunities to challenge the new law in
courts. Several religious communities have already expressed
their willingness to pursue this option.3 5 8 Individual citizens and
religious groups may seek a writ from the Russian Constitutional
Court 35 9 raising constitutional and international law questions.

See supra Part IVD(4)(v-viii) passn. The most ominous provision in the
354.
New Law is article 25(1-2) (on monitoring and control of compliance with the law).
The difficulties mentioned in 1-6 above also violate international norms,
355.
but these concerns are peculiar to measuring the new law against international

standards not necessarily reflected in the Russian Constitution or the Russian
Declaration of Human Rights.
356.
See supraPart IV(D)(3).
See supra Part IV(D)(4)(viii) (compare with the international standards, see
357.

supra Part IIl(A)).
358. See, e.g., Battling Over Russian Souls, MACLEAN's Oct 20, 1997, at 36,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File (stating that Mormons intend to challenge

the law in Constitutional Court because they wish to continue their missionary
activity). Although there is no direct ban on missionary work, bans on invitation of
foreign religious professionals, distribution of religious literature, and the
establishment of educational centers by organizations with diminished rights seriously
limit proselytizing. See Ilya Medovoi, Svoboda Sovesti Po Ranzhiru [Freedom of
Conscience on a Scale] KULTURA, Sept. 29, 1997 at 1 (Baptists would like to lodge
constitutional complaints); Zaks, supra note 5, at 1 ("[leaders of the so-called nontraditional churches, including Catholics and Protestants .... plan to challenge the
lawin the Constitutional Cour"). In 1996, the Constitutional Court declined to review
the petition submitted by Duma members to review the reactionary local religious laws.
The Court determined that there was an insufficient number of deputies presenting the
petition. See Krylova, supranote 350, at 22.
359. On procedures of the Constitutional Court, see Hausmaninger, supra note
173, at 375-77; Korkeakivi, supranote 10, at 239, 245-46. Article 125(4) of the 1993
Constitution expressly authorizes human rights complaints. The 1994 law on
Constitutional Court further clarifies the right of individuals and organizations to lodge
complaints concerning violations of constitutional rights and freedoms.
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This method may have sweeping consequences because judicial
review by the Constitutional Court is the only way to invalidate
the 1997 law, aside from resorting to the political process.
Although a human rights challenge is very strong on its merits, it
is highly unlikely that the Constitutional Court, populated by
Yeltsin's prot6g6s,3 60 will review the claim3 6 1 and support a
counter-majoritarian3 6 2 cause at the risk of further compromising
3 63
its already low public stature.
The law gives religious organizations an opportunity to appeal
non-registration in local courts.3 64 In addition to these specific
claims, individuals and organizations can allege constitutional
violations in local courts because, for the first time in Russian
history, the 1993 Constitution makes human rights guarantees
directly applicable and enforceable in the courts.3 65
Such
challenges will probably implicate freedom of expression and
manifestation of religious beliefs. In these cases, judges should
pay close attention to the text of constitutional provisions and use

360.
See Hausmaninger, supranote 173, at 368-70, 378-81, 382 (describing the
process of appointing Justices in 1993 and noting that the present Court would be
very responsive to Yeltsin's political needs). Also, of the present Justices, only Tamara
Morshchakova consistently adhered to a vision that the constitutional Court should be
the chief proponent of human rights. See id. at 354-55 & n.42.
361. As is true of its American counterpart, the Russian Constitutional Court
has broad discretion to denyjudicial review. See icL at 361. Also, this institution is also
paralyzed by its own cumbersome procedures. For example, the previous Court issued
only seventeen decisions in its two years of operation. Id It is unlikely that the
present Court will be any more efficient See id at 384. Thus, it is highly improbable
that the Constitutional Court will actually get to review religious challenges.

362.

The Constitutional Court is a wholly new experiment in Russia since 1991.

The Court must still define its proper role in the political process and imprint it on the
national consciousness. Chief Justice Zorkin's flamboyant style did not enhance the
prestige of this institution in the long run. See id. at 363, 386. Currently, the Court
has the lowest stature of all the three branches and it is very cautious about making
correct political alliances following Zorkin's fiasco in 1993 when he supported the
outgoing Parliament. The President is the most powerful figure in Russian politics and
the Court is likely to follow the President's lead. See Willerton & Shulus, supranote
173. Because the current version of the bill was prepared by the President's staff, the
Court will hesitate to overturn or limit it See also supranote 77.
363.
The new law is a "social hot potato" because of the diametrically opposed
concerns in one of the most sensitive areas-religion. The Court will have to balance
pluralistic constitutional principles with an overpowering tradition of religious
consolidation and intolerance. Moreover, the Russian tradition of autocracy makes
independent, counter-majoritarian stands extremely unpopular. Thus, taking the side
of minorities on this issue may result in temporary institutional suicide. However, in
the long run, it may define the Court as a truly independent and liberal institution.
364.
SeeTHENEW.LAw, supranote 4, atart 12(2).
365.
See KONST. RF, supranote 10, at arts.18, 15(1); Korkealdvi, supra note 10,
at 239. These provisions present a sharp contrast to the Soviet period during which
the Constitution was merely an ideological document and its guarantees were
unenforceable. See LAWYERS' COMMITEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supranote 139, at 5.
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international norms on religious rights at least as persuasive, if
3 66
not binding, authority.
Another important arena for human rights actions is the
judicial review of administrative actions in order to combat
draconian application of the law by state agencies. 3 67
In
reviewing such complaints, judges should focus on proportionality
and justifiability of administrative actions vis-a-vis religious
associations and their members, especially if the plaintiff is
affiliated with a new or minority religion.
Realistically, local
courts will probably hesitate to take up the organizational
dichotomy scheme enunciated by the law as the basis for a
constitutional challenge because they are still adjusting to their
new institutional independence. 3 6 8 However, more specialized
complaints based on specific fact patterns may serve as an
impetus to the judiciary's activism even though the judiciary has
been reluctant to serve as a constitutional watchdog in the
past.3 6 9
Importantly, Russia now has very competent legal
professionals, like Galina KrylovaO7 ° and Jacov Krotov, who have

366.
See supra Part IVD(2) for a discussion of dilemma on the status of
international legal norms. Basically, the Constitution incorporates them in domestic
law. However, the present law on religion treats them as persuasive authority for
interpreting the scope of provisions of this legislation. See THE NEW LAW, supranote 4,
at art. 2(3).
367.
See KONST. RF., supranote 10, at art. 46(2); Korkeakivi, supra note 10, at
242.
368.
The courts will have to frame constitutional issues for the Constitutional
Court to obtain invalidation of the whole structure of the new law. See supranote 359.
In the past, scholars noted such institutional problems with the courts. See, e.g.,
Sergey Pozhivilko, Spots on the Robe: What is Happening in the "Third .ngdom , " 35
RUSS. POL. & L. 82, 88-89 (1997) (exposing the instances ofjudicial arbitrariness and

local cliques with the political elite). Article 121 of the 1993 Constitution aims to make
judges more independent by prohibiting removal. KONST. RF, at art. 121(1). Yet, even if
judges are able to claim de jure institutional independence, many judges are still a part
of the nomenklatura, a Soviet-built establishment, and they are unable to sever
personal ties to it.
369.
Historically, judicial independence is problematic in Russia because it
combines two traditions, civil law and socialist, which relegate judges to servants of the
other branches and blind enforcers of legal norms. See Utter & Lundsgaard, supra
note 308, at 240-43. Russian judges are wholly untrained for and unfamiliar with the
practice of reviewing statutes for constitutional violations.
370.
Galina Krylova has just published a book about her court experiences in
defending the so called-cults. See supranote 350. This book is a unique contribution
to the advancement of human rights in general and religious rights in particular by
legal professionals. The author delineates several court cases arising in various
Russian regions under the old, more liberal law. Id- at 21-33. In most of these cases,
the courts found for those who attempted to restrict the activity of non-traditional
religious groups. I& The author offers an insightful commentary on procedural
aspects, such as admissibility of expert and lay evidence, that make it difficult for the
proponents of religious freedom to prevail. Id at 69-202. Krylova also analyzes the
issue from a global human rights perspective and highlights psychological and

230

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:167

dedicated their expertise to defend democratic freedom of
conscience norms and to counteract the mass hysteria generated
by popular anti-cultists, such as A. Dvorkin, that has found its
37 1
way into the judicial system.
The last innovative path for judicial recourse are
international legal channels. The right to appeal to international
bodies is confirmed by Article 46(3) of the Russian Constitution.
Currently, individuals may file complaints with the U.N. Human
Rights Committee or the European Court of Human Rights. The
latter is particularly promising because Russia undertook firm
human rights obligations upon becoming a member of the Council
of Europe in 1996, and has a high political stake in complying
with basic conditions of accession to this organization. 37 2 It is
hard to predict whether the European Court of Human Rights
would be willing to resolve the issues presented by Russian
plaintiffs. Since one of the Council's primary functions is to
promote human rights in its member states, and Russia has a
checkered record in this area, the Court of Human Rights may
elect to address the issue. On the other hand, history reveals
that the Court was only a reluctant champion of the rights of
minority religions. 3 73 In any event, the Court of Human Rights is
likely to be more receptive to a claim that focuses on a specific,
arbitrary denial of essential religious rights to some organizations
under Article 27(3), instead of invalidating the general
endorsement of traditional religions and the Orthodoxy.
B. Reforming Public Conception of Law and
Religious Human Rights
Aside from facial constitutional violations, the broad
discretion accorded to the registration agencies is the most
objectionable feature of the new legislation. 37 4 In the short term,
this problem should be addressed by the Ministry of Justice who
should promulgate standardized definitions of such critical terms
as "existence," "religious," and "creed" as well as provide
guidelines regarding the individuals authorized to make the final
decisions on these issues. 375

financial determinants that make the religious witch hunt a popular activity. Id. at 1721, 38-44, 50-54.
371.
Id. at 17-21,38-44,50-54.
372.
See Shestakov, supra note 101, at 69 (discussing the repercussions of
failing to implement and enforce human rights obligations in the European Convention

since Russia became a member of the Council of Europe).
373. See generaUyGunn, supranote 109.
374. See supranote Part lVD(4).
375. These words appear in Article 6(1) in the definition of religious associations.
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In the long run, reforming societal outlooks is the most
daunting challenge that Russia faces as it tries to become a
democratic state. As discussed above, both Russian people and
institutions historically gravitate toward political autocracy,
ethnic intolerance, and a single established religion or
predominant ideology.3 76 History and traditional moral theory are
compelling forces that still shape Russian politics and society
even if on a subconscious level. 3 7 7 This legacy will aggravate
normative deviations from constitutional and international
religious
human rights
principles
because
bureaucrats
responsible for implementing the new religious regime are
conditioned by Russia's past.
However, there are also nascent signs of cultural and
democratic structural changes in Russia. First of all, the Russian
Constitution endorses domestic human rights legislation that
matches liberal international standards.3 7 8 The country also has
a high political stake in keeping its international obligations. In
making Russia abide by international agreements, the world
community should emphasize Russia's sovereign interest in

choosing such behavior as opposed to forcefully antagonizing and
threatening Russian leaders as it did during the enactment of the
present law. The latter technique plays squarely into the hands

of reactionaries and nationalists. 379 For the future, funding of
international observers who will monitor the application of the
new law and participate in public life as influential interest
groups is a better, less intrusive approach.3 8 0

376.

See supraPart I(B).

377.

Id.

378.
See supraPart MI(D)(2).
379.
See supranote 8.
380. For example, following the enactment of the new law, human rights
activists began to document its application on the local level. See Nicldes, supra note
154, at 67. In the first ten days after the law's promulgation, the Center for Religion
and Law received five reports from various regions about Orthodox priests attempting
to close down Protestant religious establishments, and denying them access to public
places, such as a local House of Culture where a group of Pentecostals traditionally
held its gatherings. Id. According to E. Smyslova, an expert with the Russian Institute
of Religion and Law, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entered into an agreement with the
Patriarchate to protect Russians from "spiritual aggression" by foreigners. See Ui
There are widespread fears that foreign missionaries, especially from the Church of
Scientology, may be spies. See supra note 148. Smislova also indicated that the
Ministry of Public Health issued a circular to related agencies inviting them to monitor
the effects of sects on the physical and mental health of Russians, and to establish
"mental correction centers" for victims of religious zombying. See Nickles, supra note
154, at 67. The latter measure appears particularly ominous in light of the Soviet
experience with pskhushki See supra note 61. Apparently, the highest Russian
officials bought into the myth of the psychological destructiveness of non-traditional
religions.
For instance, Moscow Mayor, Y. Luzhkov directed municipal health
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Since the late 1980s, Russia also engaged in numerous
institutional reforms maling the judicial, law enforcement, and
systems more sensitive to human rights
administrative
38 1
concerns.
Recently, even the most repressive institution-the
Procuracy-prided itself on successfully pleading on behalf of civil
The
Human
Rights
and
political
human
rights.3 8 2

authorities to establish special services for citizens harmed by cults staffed by medical
professionals, psychologists, and Orthodox priests. See Nickles, supranote 154, at 67.
In the final stages of preparing this Note, the author had a fortunate opportunity to
meet and work with one of the leading Russian human rights activists, Dr. Larisa
Skuratovskaya. In remarking about the law, Dr. Skuratovskaya emphasized the
importance of monitoring its application to combat gross abuses. She also noted that
the law can be considered the testing ground for Russian liberalism. This was the first
time that Russian public and human rights activists actively participated in the
process leading to the enactment of the law. Even though this time, Dr. Skuratovskaya
and her colleagues were not able to stop the momentum of the "witchhunt," their active
international and domestic campaign, as well as continued commentaries and
monitoring efforts, represent a change in Russian society. Dr. Skuratovskaya was also
very optimistic about cooperating with human rights activists and scholars in the West.
For instance, she said that e-mail communications permitted the opponents of the new
law to quickly relay all the information to their colleagues around the world, to organize
a world-wide campaign, and to solicit international analysis of measures taken by the
Russian government Finally, Dr. Skuratovskaya praised human rights education
seminars held at Columbia University and the European Court of Human Rights to
introduce specialists from Russia and the former Eastern bloc countries to the
substance and practice of such international rights. Dr. Skuratovskaya expressed her
hope for a gradual change in Russian perceptions as a result of such cross-cultural
interactions, but she was also realistic about Russia's need to create its own paradigms
consistent gh international standards, taking into account Russia's unique cultural
identity.
381. See generally LAWYERS COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 139, at
90-115 (examining the reforms in the Ministry of Justice, the State Legal Department,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Procuracy, the Russian Bar Association and various
NGOs).
382. See A. Churilov, Prokurorski Nadzor za Sobludeniem Pray I Svobod
Grazhdan [The Procuracy's Monitoring of Adherence to Civil Rights and Liberties], 8
ZAKONNOST' 8, 8-9 (1997) (discussing the Procuracy's involvement in ensuring fair
regional procedures in various civil rights matters). However, in the recent freedom of
conscience case of City Prosecutorv. CARP (Collegiate Organization for Research of the
Principle), the Prosecutor sought to revoke education rights from this Unification
Church aifiliate organization for students based on allegations of zombying and
undermining families. Report forwarded by Galina Krylova (on file with author). This
case was filed by anti-cult activists in 1995 in St Petersburg City Court and sought $6
million in damages for brainwashing and destroying Russia's genetic fund. Id. at 1-2.
The Prosecutor and the Justice Department attempted to join the process to liquidate
CARP in 1996, but under the old laws the suit was not pursued because the discovery
process did not reveal any evidence on the basis of which the group could be
liquidated. Id. at 2-3. The Prosecutor reinstated his charges under the 1997 law when
the youth group applied for re-registration. Id. at 4. The hearing that took place in
September 1998 highlighted the gross inadequacies of judicial process in Russian
courts. Id at 7-19. The judge repeatedly demonstrated her anti-CARP bias, and
ultimately re-scheduled the trial when the Prosecutor was unable to prove the case. Id.
The admissibility of evidence, questioning of witnesses, and clarification of the
opponent's claims in the Russian judicial system, are heavily dependent upon the
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Commissioner38 3 may also become a player in the field of human
rights.
Non-governmental
organizations
(NGOs) are another
promising mechanism for changing popular conceptions of law
and human rights.38 4 The post-Soviet legislation enables
independent 3 83 peoples' groups to influence public opinion and
political process as mediators between specialized and state
interests. In addition, NGOs can appear in court on behalf of
human rights interests. 38 6

The interested political, social, and

religious non-governmental groups, both domestic and foreign,
should utilize this method in order to challenge the excesses in
application of the new religious legislation. The most notable of

such progressive organizations are the Christian Juris-Center, led
by A. Pchelintsev and V. Riakhovsky (recently transformed into
the Institute for the Study of Law and Religion), the Independent
Organization of Psychiatrists which provides vital expert
testimony in trials to counteract the allegations of "zombying" by
new religions, and the Committee for Freedom of Conscience, led
by G. Yakunin. 38 7 Unfortunately, the activities of the latter

presiding judge. In the instant case, the Judge refused the defense's request to obtain
a statement from the Prosecutor with particular bases for liquidation, as is required by
the 1997 law. The judge refused to admit the photos confirming the charitable
activities of CARP, and the results of the court-psychiatric expert examination of CARP
members attesting to their sanity, as irrelevant Id. at 13-15. On the other hand, the
judge allowed several representatives from the Interregional Committee for Salvation
from Totalitarian Sects to testify about the mental harm inflicted by new religions while
cutting short their cross-examination or answering the questions herself. Id. at 13-14.
The defense was not successful in the motion to dismiss the judge based on her
derogatory comments about the Unification Church. Id at 18. In addition, during the
trial, it was revealed that the City government actually provides funds to the Salvation
Committee, and that the Prosecutor's office engaged in thirty to forth minute daily
phone communications with the mother of the key witness regarding the progress of
the trial. Id. at 16-17.
383.
This office has not yet reached the same prominence as in Poland or the
Scandinavian countries, but it symbolically rallied human rights activists on various
matters. See, e.g., Utter & Lundsgaard, supranote 308, at 245. The current head of
the office, L. Levinson is an active proponent of the international standards of freedom
of conscience, and on numerous occasions spoke out against the intensification of
mass hysteria in connection with alleged zombying by foreign cults. See, e.g., Usupova,
supranote 148, at 28-29.
384.
See generally S..Bocharova, Rol' Obshestvennykh Obedinenij v Zashite Pray
Cheloveka [The Role of NGOs in Protecting Human Rights], 1 VESTNIK MOSKOVSKOGO
UNERSTTA: PRAVO 98 (1997).

385. In the Soviet period, non-conforming NGO's were certainly outlawed. The
only officially tolerated NGO was Moscow's Helsinki Human Rights Group. This
organization was never truly independent See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
supranote 139, at 107-111. Currently, NGO's can genuinely represent a wide variety
ofviewpoints. They will be instrumental in creating a culture of ideological pluralism.
386.
SeeBocharova, supranote 384, at 105.
387.
See KRYLOVA, supra note 350, at 44-49.
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organization often received negative publicity detrimental to its
lofty goals.
In fact, Article 8(7) of the instant legislation specifically
encourages such participation and instructs state organs to
involve religious organizations in the decisions affecting their
activities. 38 8 Notably, this provision does not discriminate against
new religious organizations.3 8 9 One can only hope that local
authorities will carefully consider this provision when dealing
with the various interests of the religious communities.
A robust polemic in the mass media is another sign of
changing times. During the period of adopting the new law and
in the months following its enactment, the Russian media covered

the developments in great detail and offered insightful political
and legal commentaries. The Moscow News and Nezavisimaya
Gazeta emerged as the true champions of religious liberty. Also,
Russians now have access to information reflecting democratic
390
values advanced by the Western media and on the Internet.
Finally, even the Orthodox Church, the primary lobbyist and
beneficiary of the new law, has an inherent stake in resisting a
strict application of the law. Both traditional and non-traditional
religions should be wary of numerous provisions giving the state
enormous control over religious organizations. The registration
requirement
and continued
state
supervision
over an
organization's compliance with its charter provide ample
opportunities for intervention into religious affairs. As its own
history demonstrates, the Patriarchate must realize that a short
term gain of virtual religious monopoly of the Orthodox Church
may cause a long term loss of its institutional independence, a
feature that Patriarch Alexii II considers essential in church-state
3 91
relations.

VI. CONCLUSION

The law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations
represents a major setback in Russia's recent human rights
record. The law clashes with the constitutional principles of
individual religious liberty and subverts the notion of equality of
religious organizations. The law establishes a system in which

388.
389.
390.

SeeTHME NEW LLW, supranote4, at art 8(7).
Id
See discussion supra note 380.

391.

The laws making the judiciary more independent, see supra note 368,

create an excellent opportunity for this branch to develop into a protector of human
rights. Unfortunately, the judges are not immune from stereotypes of destructive
cultural infiltration offered by the traditional Russian moral theory.
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religious organizations that cannot prove their fifteen-year legal
existence enjoy only a fraction of the rights reserved for
traditional religions. Although this restriction is only a temporary
probation period, it may effectively destroy less-favored religious
communities. Even if they survive, they will almost certainly be
burdened by the vicissitudes of administrative arbitrariness.
Another hallmark of the 1997 law is the laborious registration
process, reminiscent of the Soviet period. The law confers great
powers on agencies to supervise the activities of religious
organizations under the pretext of verifying their compliance with
charters, and to initiate the liquidation process on a variety of
grounds.
Although in a brief post-communist euphoria Russia enacted
one of the most progressive constitutions in the world and ratified
numerous international human rights instruments, it was naive
to believe that in such a period of acute cultural crisis the newlyimplanted liberal principles (democratic Pravo) could easily
overcome the millennium-old Russian moral theory (reactionary
Pravo). The current legislation (zakon) is a reflexive response to
what proponents of the legislation view as ruinous religious
anarchy that threatens internal security, rather than as desirable
religious pluralism.
Even though Russia did not wish to
contravene democratic principles, it had absolutely no experience
in dealing with its very real problems in a democratic fashion. By
default, in creating the new law, policy-makers reverted to a
slightly modified traditionalism with a stricter control of religious
institutions.
Russia is currently reviving religious policies that are
historically tested and culturally suitable. In practice, Russia
may develop a viable cooperationist or endorsement mode of
church-state relations rather than pursue the ideal of benign
neutrality as provided for in the Russian Constitution. European
experience illustrates that substantial religious liberty is
attainable
in
cooperationist,
endorsement,
and
even
establishment models as long as the state maintains some
religious equality within the preferential superstructure. Such
balancing is possible when human rights are an integral part of a

country's political and social culture.
Unfortunately, Russia does not share the Western democratic
tradition of respect for human rights. Therefore, Russia must
strive twice as hard to assure the equality of individuals and
organizations in their access to religious rights. The thrust of the
new law contravenes this goal and casts serious doubt on the
future of religious liberty in Russia. Yet, there is a glimmer of
hope embodied in the Russian Constitution and international
instruments. This alternative set of norms permits interested
individuals and groups to challenge the new law, and to counter
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the excesses of its strict, reactionary enforcement. As Russian
society stabilizes, and its liberal institutions and traditions
solidify, the international human rights tradition may yet prevail
over nationalistic sentiments.
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